ELECTIONS THAT CHANGED NOTHING

Arif Yunusov, Head of the Department of Conflict and Migration Studies of the Institute for Peace and Democracy (Azerbaijan)

The year 2024 will be etched in history as a period of presidential and parliamentary elections in 64 countries, with the potential for resulting in radical political transformations in a number of countries. Or, conversely, it could become a year of even greater preservation of status quo in authoritarian and dictatorial countries through the elections held.

In this regard, significant attention was drawn to the presidential elections in Azerbaijan (February 7) and Russia (March 15-17) in 2024. The similarity of situation in terms of numerous indicators and factors between both countries was evident, a fact vividly reaffirmed by the 2024 elections. Moreover, the recent elections can serve as an illustration for many, offering a clear example of how elections are organized and conducted in authoritarian, non-democratic countries in our time.

Elections amidst Conflict

Elections in Azerbaijan and Russia were held during a period of conflict for both countries. With the help of Russia, Azerbaijan secured a victory over Armenia in the struggle for Karabakh in the fall of 2020, and following one-day large-scale battles on September 19, 2023, the exodus of the entire Armenian population from Karabakh began. Despite Azerbaijani authorities declaring an end to the conflict with Armenia and the start of the return process for Azerbaijani settlers to Karabakh, the confrontation, in fact, continues, with the struggle over territories along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border currently at the forefront. The portrayal of Armenia as an enemy remains a significant element in propaganda within Azerbaijan’s society. Even after the official end of conflict with Armenia, anti-Armenian propaganda persists, still serving as a central consolidating idea within the country. However, the conflict with Armenia in 2023 led to strained relations between Azerbaijan and the collective West.

Russia, in its turn, has been waging a war with Ukraine since February 2022, and this factor is also used by the government machine in its propaganda campaign. Similarly, the war with Ukraine led to a sharp deterioration in Russia’s relations with the collective West.

Thus, as a result of conflicts with their neighbors and the collective West, authorities in Azerbaijan and Russia made a decision to hold presidential elections. Moreover, this move occurred almost simultaneously: on December 7, 2023, I. Aliyev announced snap elections in Azerbaijan, followed by V. Putin’s announcement the next day in Moscow regarding upcoming presidential elections in Russia and his intention to run.

Amidst Internal Repression

It is noteworthy that both leaders have held office for extensive periods - V. Putin since 1999, and I. Aliyev since 2003. Accordingly, they were both re-elected for the 5th time in 2024. At the same time, both leaders consistently secured victory due to frauds during the pre-election phase and falsification of election results. While these actions sparked large-scale protests among the opposition and citizens, they did not hinder their retention of power. Thus, in 2024, V. Putin and I. Aliyev remained true to themselves.

Additionally, both leaders, throughout their extended rule, have been constantly accused of turning Russia and Azerbaijan into corrupt dictatorships, abusing their power and violating human rights. Consequently, independent media in both countries have shut down or been compelled to operate from abroad. Government-controlled media pay disproportionately high attention to the heads of state. Representatives of the political opposition face persecution, with some ending up in exile and even in prison. In elections at various levels, votes can be adjusted to achieve the desired outcome.

Amidst Background “Contenders”

Drawing from past election experiences and the accompanying protests, V. Putin and I. Aliyev have created a system of repression that prevents large-scale demonstrations; they also use elections to divide the opposition, barring genuine opponents of the authorities from participating in elections and “competing” only with candidates loyal to them.

It was no different this time. During the 2024 elections in Russia, 11 candidates submitted their documents to the Central Election Commission (CEC), with 8 being affiliated with political parties. There were no representatives of the genuine opposition among them. The RF CEC opted to register three representatives of systemic forces as challengers of Putin. Among these, two (L.Slutsky and N.Kharitonov) were from the so-called “opposition parties” (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and Communist Party of the Russian Federation), which for the 5th time, namely, throughout Putin's rule, have played the role of authorities’ puppets assigned to them. The third candidate, so-called “independent” politician V. Davankov, also fully supports Putin's policies.

The same situation occurred during the registration in Azerbaijan, when the genuine opposition abstained from participating in the elections, and alongside the main candidate, I. Aliyev, representatives of systemic forces were registered. Moreover, 5 candidates out of 6 have run “against” Aliyev from one to five times.

As can be seen, in both countries, staunch supporters of incumbent presidents V. Putin and I. Aliyev were given the green light to run in the elections. It is no coincidence that during debates in both countries, candidates “against” V. Putin and I. Aliyev actually lauded them. And immediately after the elections, all the “opponents” of the authoritarian leaders rushed to congratulate them on their victory, turning a blind eye to falsifications and fraud. Following the elections, they resumed their roles as members of parliament.

There's No One to Argue with

Another parallel between the Russian and Azerbaijani elections was the absence of incumbent presidents in the debates with other candidates, a practice they never engaged in.

Initially, V. Putin provided explanations for his refusal to participate. During his first election in March 2000, he declared that “modern election technology is a rather unconscionable business.” Four years later, he said that “it’s not interesting; ...it’s such a meaningless game of either giveaway checkers or a game where one of the players knows the result in advance.” Afterwards, he stopped providing explanations, and instead his spokesman D. Peskov would repeat the same words, sometimes citing the president’s “hectic schedule” as the reason.

In the case of Azerbaijan, I. Aliyev never considered it necessary to even explain the reasons for his absence from pre-election debates, sending a representative from the ruling party to listen to flattering remarks directed towards him.

In anti-democratic countries, another mandatory aspect during elections is the voter turnout and the number of votes “received”. In such countries, high voter turnout is not merely seen as a positive factor, but a proof of the legitimacy of the existing system and the ruling regime. Supporters of the ruling party, other pro-government parties and organizations, public sector employees, workers of businesses loyal to the government, as well as their relatives and friends are obliged to ensure turnout at polling stations.

In both countries, these 2024 elections were essentially reduced to a single-question referendum: “Are you in favor of or against the president?”

With Widely Known Falsifications 

Of course, in addition to the mentioned factors, which were supposed to ensure a high voter turnout, administrative capabilities were also used, alongside overt falsification, ballot stuffing and counting fraud.

Added to that, Russia implemented remote electronic voting for the first time in its presidential election history, covering 28 regions of the country. During this process, citizens cast their votes remotely from their computers and gadgets, thereby extending the election duration to three days from March 15 to 17. Given the absence of independent monitoring of Russia's electronic voting system, remote voting created enormous opportunities for the falsification of results. 

Consequently, the voter turnout levels were roughly similar, with over 77% in Russia and over 76% in Azerbaijan. At the same time, more than 87% of voters officially “voted” for Putin, while in Azerbaijan, this figure was deemed low for Aliyev, called the “Triumphant” by official propaganda for his victory over Armenians and return of Karabakh into the country’s fold. Therefore, the CEC “recorded” more than 92% of votes for the “Triumphant” president Aliyev. Accordingly, the candidates and opponents of the incumbent presidents “received” their potion of votes: in Azerbaijan - from the highest with more than 2% (Razi Nurullayev) to the lowest with 0.66% (Fuad Aliyev). In total, all 6 “contenders” of I. Aliyev together gained only around 8%. In Russia, with half as many candidates, the Central Election Commission registered slightly more votes in favor of Putin’s opponents, ranging within 3-4%, totaling more than 12%.

What Next?

Once again Russia and Azerbaijan held elections devoid of any choice. Quite predictably, the election results found support only from anti-democratic regimes of Africa, Latin America and Asia, as well as allies within the CIS. The latter, following a tradition, failed to identify any irregularities during the elections in both countries, labeling them as “free and democratic”, and “an example to follow.” The negative reaction by the West and international organizations (OSCE/ODIHR, PACE, etc.) was perceived by the regimes of V. Putin and I. Aliyev as “biased and non-objective,” most importantly, in the context of geopolitical confrontation with the West.

Particularly amidst this confrontation, there arises a question regarding further unfolding developments in Azerbaijan and Russia. All the more so that despite all the similarities in internal dynamics, including electoral procedures, the attitudes and approaches of the West towards Russia and Azerbaijan are somewhat different.

Following the aggression against Ukraine and numerous crimes committed by the Russian army against civilians in that country, leaders of the US and the EU openly label V. Putin a war criminal who should face trial. In March 2023, the International Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for V. Putin. The recent election results in Russia were also met with negative reactions, leading to PACE recognizing Putin as an illegitimate president on April 18, 2024, accusing him of murdering opposition figure A. Navalny and creating a totalitarian state. In other words, V. Putin has become an outcast in the eyes of the West, making direct negotiations with him impossible. The goal of the collective West is to help Ukraine in every possible way in its struggle against Russia, to push to the extent possible Russia out of many regions of the world (primarily the South Caucasus) and to exert pressure on the Kremlin’s allies.

The European and US leaders have somewhat different approaches regarding Azerbaijan. The geopolitical factor plays a role here: in the South Caucasus today, Armenia stands as the only pro-Western country, seeking to distance itself from Russia. This has led to a serious confrontation with the Kremlin, which is trying to put pressure on Armenia through its ally Azerbaijan. The geopolitical position of Armenia is extremely complex: the country is landlocked with no access to Europe; its regional ally, Iran, which is also aligned with Russia, is engaged in a severe confrontation with the West. Armenia has a century-long confrontation with Turkey, a strategic ally of Azerbaijan. Pro-Russian forces are in power in Georgia. In these circumstances, ensuring Armenia's security emerges as a primary focus for Western policy in the region. At this stage it is imperative for the West to prevent Azerbaijan from taking aggressive actions against Armenia, force I. Aliyev to continue negotiations with Armenia on the Western platform (in Europe and the USA) and at the same time improve Armenia’s relations with Turkey, a strategic ally of Azerbaijan and a NATO member.

Taking into account these circumstances, as well as the fact that the West’s focus and resources are directed towards supporting Ukraine and Israel, the US and EU are using a softer approach towards Azerbaijan. On the one hand, the elections in Azerbaijan have been called undemocratic, J. Biden has not yet congratulated I. Aliyev on his election victory, and European leaders have also refrained from congratulating him. On the other hand, however, EU Head Charles Michel called on February 8 and, as reported by Azerbaijani authorities, congratulated I. Aliyev on his re-election. Nonetheless, unlike previous occasions where all Western leaders always officially congratulated I. Aliyev immediately after the elections, this time they practically refrained from doing so. Charles Michel’s call appeared to be more related to the issue of Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations and the resumption of talks within the Brussels format. That is why in his inaugural speech on February 14, I. Aliyev omitted any mention of either the United States or any European countries for the first time and bitterly stated: “They are not waiting for us anywhere and they no longer conceal it. We are part of the Turkic family.”
In other words, I. Aliyev is viewed as an authoritarian leader, sometimes labeled as a dictator, whose repressive policies against the opposition and dissidents in Azerbaijan constantly draw harsh criticism from the West. Yet, Azerbaijan is a strategic ally not only of Turkey, a NATO member and a serious player in the Middle East, but also Israel, aiding in the latter's confrontation against Iran. Moreover, Azerbaijan possesses abundant oil and gas reserves, leading the EU to promptly secure a gas supply agreement with the country following the Russian aggression against Ukraine. US and EU leaders opted to negotiate with I. Aliyev, hoping to be able to change his pro-Russian policy. At the same time, they periodically hinted at the possibility of shifting from “carrot policy” to the one of the “stick”, manifested by sanctions.

In Azerbaijan, similar to Russia, in relations with the collective West, expectations are set on the presidential elections in the United States and the potential return of D. Trump to power. In both Moscow and Baku there is eager anticipation and belief that under D. Trump everything regarding Russia and Azerbaijan will change dramatically.

I. Aliyev will not diverge from his support for Putin’s policies, continuing to exert harsh pressure on Armenia in tandem with Russia, and not ruling out the option of resorting to force in the form of brief skirmishes along the border. Domestically, the policy of repression against the last oppositionists and dissidents who are still free will only intensify. We should expect new arrests, primarily of individuals labeled as pro-Western by the Azerbaijani government. This, in turn, will lead to a further escalation of tensions in Azerbaijan’s relations with the US and the EU, inevitably leading to discussions about imposing sanctions against (initially) officials of the ruling regime.

The internal situation in Russia will also get tougher dynamically, with the economy and political life transitioning towards a wartime footing, and with all the ensuing circumstances. Moreover, the war in Ukraine in 2024 will take an even more violent turn, possibly leading to a direct confrontation between Russia and the NATO in the early months of the following year. It is no coincidence that the discussion of such possibilities has been recurrent in Russia, with V. Putin even mentioning ahead of the elections the prospect of nuclear weapons use.

This is the final material based on the results of the study of the Armenian-Azerbaijani context in the presidential elections in Azerbaijan and Russia in 2024.

Publication of this material is supported by Democracy Development Foundation. The opinions and positions expressed in the material may not reflect the views and positions of Democracy Development Foundation.