Russia and the South Caucasus: Agendas, Priorities and Realities - 2019: Page 9 of 9

categorical. The relations in the Russia-Iran-Turkey triangle and in a wider circle cannot but affect the Caucasian policy of Russia and its individual components (one example is the Iran-Azerbaijan-Russia transport corridor, which is talked about a lot, but which still hasn't been able to be launched). I spoke about the role of Turkey earlier, in addition, strengthening the position of this country in Nakhichevan can have far-reaching consequences. Russia is not an exclusive player in the region - although the Caucasus is not so oversaturated with external influence as the Middle East, but nonetheless... Western partners also have certain tools and use them effectively, taking advantage of the real or imaginary mistakes made by Moscow, which is quite objective and logical.

As for the mantras about the desirability of the “collapse of Iran” and the peaceful democratic future of the conglomerate of its ethno-confessional debris that could form in its place (due to a direct military aggression and surrender, which Tehran apparently must sign?), it should be noted that I have occasionally heard such conversations in the past 25 years. This (the example of Iraq and Syria is in front of everyone's eyes), as well as the arguments about "30 million Azerbaijanis" can hardly be seriously commented on ...