Aleksandr Gushchin

Topics: Integration processes and security issues in the post-Soviet territory; Prospects of the SCO and BRICS as projects; Ukrainian crisis

Newspaper “Hetq”, www.hetq.am

Question - Why design multiple integration projects (EEU, SCO, BRICS) with the participation of or with a tendency to invite to membership the very same countries? What is the fundamental difference between these projects?

Answer - There is nothing surprising in this. The EEU is a profoundly post-Soviet project, despite the fact that things often get down to the possible future accession of the so-called CIS countries that are further foreign neighbors for Russia. This project, the idea of ​​which was lodged back in 1990 by the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev and has been conceptually developed by the President Russia V. V. Putin, in his pre-election article, published in the "Izvestia" in October 2011: it connects the states in the post-Soviet space with Russia featuring as the main dominant state. Of course, it presumes a higher degree of integration, but for Russia is also a geopolitical union, when with no major economic benefits for Russia the Union will, for example, include countries with extremely weak economies like Kyrgyzstan; it will be largely and only due to Russia that the economic situation of those countries will be preserved within the EEU.

The SCO is rather an organization where the interaction between Russia and China is the crucial factor. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is about cooperation in the fields of security and the economy. However, it is neither a military bloc nor an economic one. Today, however, I would not agree to the evaluations of some experts who say that the accession of India and Pakistan to the SCO is another milestone in the development of the organization. Rather, the accession of these countries with such contradictions and China’s agreement to the accession of India to the SCO indicate that China has sought, and will achieve certain goals in the region, both within and outside the framework of the SCO, regardless of the fate of this organization. The SCO is increasingly becoming a negotiating platform. There is no need to speak about any strategic opposition between India and China in Central Asia yet. In some sense, the SCO is getting blurred, while China continues to implement its global projects

BRICS is a more extensive organization than the SCO. It is, in fact, only in its initial stage. Today, the volume of trade between the BRICS countries is not very significant in the general proportions. This is especially true about China. Russia largely sees BRICS as an alternative to the West, but this is not true of its BRICS partners. The same Brazil and India, along with the BRICS, are actively developing their relations with the United States. At the same time, in the future the BRICS could play an important role, in terms of the formation of a new financial architectonic world. Such projects as the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) are very interesting in this regard, but again China will be the one to play the dominant role.

Question - How realistic is it to grant Ukraine a visa-free regime now when the eastern border of the country is not controlled by the official Kiev and the West is also becoming restless?

Answer - I think that Ukraine should not yet think about a visa-free regime with the EU. It is not going to happen. And the Eastern Partnership Summit in Riga clearly showed that the introduction of the visa-free regime is not considered by Europeans, they will slow down this process in every possible way, at the same time providing some single bonuses in order to make the appearance of compliance with previous decisions on the movement of Ukraine towards Europe. I do not exclude the possibility that in the long run such a regime could be introduced, but it is not a matter of the upcoming one to two years. To do this, a settlement in the south-east of Ukraine and reforms all over Ukraine, a more stable situation in the country will be required. The decision of expert committees to assess the possibility of introducing a visa-free regime to be engaged in Ukraine will be an important indicator.

David Stepanyan,  www.arminfo.am

Question - In response to the question about the prospects of Armenia in the EEU Eurasian skeptics offer to talk about the deplorable prospects of the Eurasian integration project. What do the prospects of the EEU look like to you?

Answer - It depends on how you evaluate the project – as primarily a political or an economic one. Russia has often set the political tone of the EEU. However, some experts have argued the primacy of the economic component, the rush to accept members like Kyrgyzstan shows that Moscow is in a hurry, taking on board the EEU members who are not ready. By the way, there are very serious internal contradictions on the EEU in Kyrgyzstan.

As for the economy, the past year has shown that there are contradictions in the matter of a coordinated customs policy towards third countries, especially in political crises such as Ukrainian, among the members of the EEU.

Another important point is posed by the negative reaction in Kazakhstan and Belarus on the introduction of a single currency, when everything was done to show that the initiative is but premature.

There are many other risky moments, too. They do not in any way indicate the futility of the project. Since January 1 higher education diplomas issued by the Member States have started to be recognized within the territory of the EEU. Citizens of Kazakhstan, Belarus and Armenia have the right to work in Russia without patents. All these are pros.

The EEU certainly has a number of promising components, but the fact is that its members also have risky aspects: those involve both the achievement of an increase in the trade between the two countries due to the growth of imports and falling exports: the main export of Kazakhstan is beyond the EEU. This will bring about an increase in the migration flows, from Kyrgyzstan, for example. A serious issue Armenia may face will be the prices in the domestic market and the problem of transit through Georgia. Moreover, in most EEU countries, there is a relatively high level of corruption and a high level of non-economic component constituents which is an absolute brake for integration and raises the issue of modernizing the national economies.

Question - Armenia and Azerbaijan joined the SCO as dialogue partners. How likely is a dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the framework of the SCO with no mention of the Karabakh problem, and what are its prospects?

Answer – This is a rather complicated question, but  I do not think that today there is an alternative to the Minsk Group. The West, especially the United States are unlikely to let go of the region and leave the solution of the problems, including the Karabakh conflict, to the discretion of the SCO and Russia; it seems to me, it would not be very profitable. Baku would certainly like it, but it seems to me that at this stage it is an element of bargain in the relations between Azerbaijan and the West. The US is unlikely to let Baku be more deeply involved in the SCO, and the organization itself, in the case of the integration of Armenia and Azerbaijan will look even more wobbly now. In my opinion, there is no alternative to the group for the settlement as of today, and such associations as SCO are unlikely to be able to offer radically new plans to address the issue and satisfy the parties.

Question - In the joint summit of BRICS, EEU and SCO held in Ufa President Serzh Sargsyan actually invited these organizations to participate in the construction of the Armenia-Iran railway, designed to provide the EAEC access to the Indian Ocean through the Persian Gulf. Comment on the prospects of the project and the possible participation of member countries of the three organizations, please.

Answer - That project is still in a rather distant future. The revised statement made by the Head of the Railways Yakunin on his position (he first announced of his skepticism, and then softened his view) shows an important thing - that in political terms, this project is still important to Moscow and that it is not going to allow any damage to its information image. However, the original statement indicates that the project is not seen as cost-effective. I think that in the condition of sanctions Russia will find it difficult to invest in such projects that are even more conditioned by political considerations about Georgia as a transit country. However, Iran’s position is also very important. Given the possible warming with the United States, it is possible that Iran will be more active in this direction. However, since the likelihood of this warming is again in the long term, Moscow will resist excessive political activity of Yerevan towards Iran, which could give it greater freedom of action. For Russia it is important to preserve Armenia within its influence. However, at this stage of the project there is hardly anyone apart from Armenia who needs the implementation of the project in economic terms, and it is unrealistic. Although Russia does not hide this project far, and leaves as a possible tool for the future, knowing its political importance.

Question – The Russian policy in the post-Soviet space, in particular in relation to Armenia, continues to rely on Russia's participation in the security of the partner countries. Isn’t it time to replace the foreign policy priorities by joint economic projects?

Answer - I do not see a contradiction here. One is not a hindrance. Russia's task is to be able, by combining the soft power, efficient management, respect for partners and toughness, as appropriate, to protect its interests, achieving stability in the region and to ensure the presence of Armenia in the EEU as most comfortable for both Armenia and all the other members of the organization.

The recent events in Yerevan showed that in some of these areas there are still, so to say, reservations in this regard. Having a great share in the energy and other sectors does not yet mean to be able to manage that efficiently. In case the situation changes for the better in this aspect, we will not give the competitors a chance to drive us out, including the Western competitors; moreover, we ourselves will not be tempted to look for a problem where there is none. I mean suspicions of serious external influence in the recent developments in Baghramyan Avenue.

Armen Minasyan, www.panorama.am

Question - What is the main flaw of the Eastern Partnership program?

Answer – The flaw consists in the fact that its operating countries (and these are the countries of the so-called New Europe - Poland as well as the Scandinavian Sweden, while the countries of Old Europe rather act as observers) were not able to implement the originally global plan. • One of the negative factors was that the project (the Eastern Partnership - Ed.) was treated with the application of the same patterns, not quite realizing, on the one hand, the differences among the participant countries of the Eastern Partnership, and on the other, the resistance from Russia (which was clearly demonstrated by the example of the Ukrainian crisis) ... But talk about a complete failure is impossible. During this time, important steps have been taken in the ideological, if I may say so, area due to financed internships, grants, development projects for individual institutions of culture and science, which is very important in the context of soft power, a direction in which the West may end up with a great head start, as compared with Russia.

Question - How topical is the Commonwealth of Independent States at the moment?

Answer - The CIS has long died as a full-fledged integration association, there are many other more important and topical projects, economic, military, political, even global ones within its territory, such as the SCO.

There are practically no prospects for the CIS as an organization, I think that it already belongs to history and is nothing more than a platform for discussing issues. However, it's still important, it is no coincidence that Ukraine, despite all the talks, did not withdraw from the CIS, the free trade zone, since in that case the losses it would incur are but obvious. However, from the perspective of the development of the organization, the CIS project has finally lost pace and prospects. Serious integration initiatives are put forward and will be nominated in other formats.

Question – What prospects and future do you see for the EEU in the context of the confrontation between Russia and the West?

Answer - The future is rather vague. Of course, the effective development of the EEU will require lifting the sanctions and removing the political tensions between Russia and the EU in the first place, as well as work to make the EEU an important element of transit between Europe and Asia, which needs serious infrastructure. Otherwise, if we are speaking about a project from Murmansk to Shanghai, the fate of the EEU is to be an attachment of China, not a real bridge between Europe and Asia. In the case of normalizing relations with the West, Russia will be able to implement the concept of balancing between the West and Beijing in the context of the EEU, securing the greatest benefits from the transcontinental trade, including the use of the Northern Sea Route. In this case, the ideas that have been expressed by known political scientists and experts Krastev and Leonard about pairing the EEU and the EU can be implemented. But in many respects, it is a phantom, both because of the differences between the political and economic systems, decision-making mechanisms, and because of the tense relations between Russia and the West.

Gagik Baghdasaryan, www.newsarmenia.am

Question - Do you think the policy and the role of Iran in the region after the expected withdrawal of Western sanctions against that country will change? How realistic is it to see a radical change in Iran's foreign policy?

Answer – There will not be any cardinal changes, Iran will not actively take on the leading role in the fight against ISIS. Today, Iran will pursue a rather soft policy, the sanctions are not lifted yet, besides, it has a major confrontation with the Saudis and Israel. However, later Iran will become increasingly active in case the sanctions are lifted and its interests will spread out very widely, which may, by the way, often contradict the interests of Russia.

Question - Is the normalization of relations between Iran and the West profitable to Russia?

Answer – It is not from the economic point of view, no matter how much they speak of the costs, and how much they say that the waiting period has leveled the risk of falling prices. They will fall and most likely it will not allow Russia to increase production, to be actively engaged in the exploration. Thus, this agreement is under sanctions; of course, this is quite a serious blow to the industry's revenues and the country as a whole.

The prices will not fall immediately, it is unprofitable for Iran, too, but in the long term the Iranian factor will help to keep the oil prices low.

With regard to the political scenarios, in the short term, it is rather a plus in the Syrian context, but it is too early to talk about any strategic advantages at the moment. Much will depend on the situation in the Middle East as a whole, because Iran has serious opponents in the persons of the Saudis and Israel.

There is no need to speak about the warming of relations between Tehran and Washington either. The deal as a whole is profitable for Russia, maybe not to the same extent as for the US, who has had two major successes with Iran and Cuba. Nevertheless, the interests of the US and those of Russia generally match on this issue.

Question - How promising is the closer interaction of Armenia with an integration project like the SCO? What are the economic benefits of such cooperation for Armenia?

Answer – I think is another important platform, but I would refrain from overestimating the SCO format. I think that the bilateral format, with both China and Russia, will remain a priority, but there is no harm from the cooperation within the SCO framework either. It is a different matter that there is no need to expect any breakthroughs from it.

Question - After the European Games in Baku, the situation on the contact line in Karabakh conflict zone has begun to escalate again. Do you think Azerbaijan can by itself decide on a large-scale military action without the approval of at least one of the world's power centers, and are there superpowers interested in a new war in Karabakh?

Answer – I do not think that the situation will change dramatically, even taking into account the cooling between Baku and EU and a certain change in the US position. Drastic changes, in my opinion, will not happen in military terms, in my opinion.

Artak Barseghyan, www.armradio.am

Question - Mr. Gushchin, today Russia is actively involved in several integration projects - EEU, CIS, BRICS, SCO, and CSTO. Which of these associations, in your opinion, has a political future?

Answer – From the point of view of future development, undoubtedly, the EEU and the BRICS are the most promising of all. Just do not confuse the goals and objectives of the all these organizations you enumerated, to ascribe things envisaged for the others, to expect things the partners do not. But in general, due the depth of processes occurring in them these two organizations are currently the leaders in terms of their effectiveness.

Question - After the collapse of the Soviet Union, recently centrifugal processes have intensified, and Moscow is losing its former partners. Is this the fault of the Kremlin only, or is the West to be held accountable for this, too?

Answer – No, I am not inclined to write off all to the external factors. This external factor is now put forth all the time, and it is true of not only the current events, but also the events of 1917, the Perestroika, and so on.

Of course, it exists today, just as it existed then, but to reduce everything to a simple Maidan and to use this Turkic word in order to explain all the processes related to the protests in post-Soviet countries would be wrong. Politics is not a primitive matter, there are many factors involved and, of course, it is not appropriate to reduce everything to "the fault of the West" is not worth it. By the way, not the fault of Beijing, either.

As for Russia, the notorious soft power, the understanding the internal layouts in the neighboring countries come not in monosyllables, they are multifaceted. Understanding that money talks, but not always, and it takes an ability to properly dispose of it and organize administration in order to attain all is not by far our strength. But I hope that after going through the difficulties, we can more accurately assess this or that particular situation. There is no alternative, otherwise Russia will again experience the same problems in the relations with its neighbors.

Question – Do you think the Ukrainian crisis may cause a further escalation of the conflict between Washington and Moscow?

Answer – Of course, this is an option. Probably, after the constitutional amendments in Kiev, the United States will now be actively pedaling the theme of Kiev’s compliance with the Minsk agreements, and the administrations of the DNI and LC will have to think seriously about their own political future. In this situation, the holding of elections in the DNI and LC will be a clear violation of the Minsk-2 agreement, from the perspective of the West.

Russia will try to force the republic to take some tactical counteraction towards settlement, and in fact, such a gesture has already been made; a restriction and withdrawal of forces can be seen. However, strategically, the situation has not changed, despite the gestures of Kiev and those of the militias.

There are two options - either autonomy with limited rights or a frozen conflict and Russia supporting the unrecognized republics.

The first option, while de facto pushing the whole Crimean issue beyond the brackets, in terms of its constant actualization by the West, now seems to be more acceptable to Moscow, no matter how unfortunate it is for the supporters of the idea of ​​New Russia. Today, by the way, it has become fashionable to say that the concept of New Russia, has kind of not existed at all, and that no one in Moscow has ever seriously bet on it. It is hardly possible to accept such an explanation, but it is clear that it might as well work as a way out of this situation, and although the decision on the modification of the project was obviously made it in the last few months and specifically under the influence of the events underway, that is, in the reactive, rather than proactive mode.

Probably, in the context of the Iranian deal some improvement in the communication, if not rapprochement between Moscow and Washington can be observed. However, the following demands by Kiev regarding the establishment of control over the border and elections may be ignored, which may again lead to an aggravation of the confrontation situation. I think that despite the fact that the broad autonomy of Donbass will be difficult to achieve it still remains as a key option.

Mariam Grigoryan, 1in.am

Question - Russia will give us a loan of 200 million US dollars, in addition, there is information about the sale of the missile system "Iskander M" to Armenia. It is believed that if in any case, "Iskander M" is sold to Armenia, it will be followed by the sale of a large quantity of weapons to Azerbaijan. How do you evaluate all this? Isn’t the balance of forces between Armenia and Azerbaijan breached by this sale?

Answer – The loan will be allocated for a period of 13 years, the first three years of which on preferential terms - at 3%. At the same time, Armenia will also fund the program by the amount of 10% of the total amount in the form of advance payments.

I think that it does not onerous conditions as some Armenian experts wrote. Of course, the recent events have accelerated the decision on the loan, but I think that such things cannot be solved in a few days, probably, an agreement was in the process of preparation, but it was accelerated by the events.

With regard to the balance of forces, I think that it will not change drastically, it will be leveled, smoothed, but purely quantitatively Azerbaijan will exceed by its technical units and numerically as well. However, this is not such an advantage that would push it, to try to resolve the issue by force, because the Armenian armed forces are capable of inflicting serious losses and restrain the assault.