Zaal Anjaparidze
Expert
Georgia
Online press conference with Georgian independent expert Zaal Anjaparidze.
Topic: Domestic and foreign policy of Georgia
Newspaper «Hetq», www.hetq.am
- Do you see a prospect for the settlement of the Russian - Georgian relations? What is the public attitude to Georgia in Russia at the moment? Are there political forces holding pro-Russian positions and following the pro-Russian vector of development?
Answer - Prospects for a comprehensive settlement of the Russian-Georgian relations are difficult to consider both in the short and in the medium term, due to the position of Russia itself, which offers Georgia to start the normalization of relations from scratch, taking into account the "new realities." These new realities mean that Georgia should come to terms with the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with the presence of the Russian troops, with all the ensuing consequences. It is understandable that no Georgian authoritywould ever agree to that.
Naturally, all these circumstances form public attitudes towards Russia. I want to emphasize that this is not translated into a negative attitude to the Russian people. There are no explicit manifestations of Russophobia in Georgia, except forindividual cases. According to a recent poll the number of those who think that Russia poses a real threat to Georgia has increased, as compared with the rates of a poll from last year. This is probably due both to the events in Ukraine, and increased Russian military presence in the occupied regions of Georgia - Abkhazia and Tskhinvali. 80% of respondents believe that Russia does have some impact on Georgia, but this impact is negative. However, one cannot deny the fact that part of the Georgian society has pro-Russian sentiments. Let me repeat that, if we believe the polls, the number of the supporters of Georgia joining the Eurasian Union has increased since last year from 20% to 31%. Approximately the same number of respondents - 35% - believe that Georgia will benefit more from the normalization of relations with Russia and the refusal from NATO. It is on this social base that Georgia has pro-Russian political forces and social groups. However, here it should be emphasized that they can be called pro-Russian only conditionally, as none of them are ready to sacrifice the sovereignty of Georgia, or to cross the so-called "Red line" for the normalization of relations with Russia. In contrast to the pro-Western parties, they urge to build relations with Russia on the basis of "real-politics", considering the rapidly changing international environment.
- How can the processes in Ukraine influence the Georgian domestic and foreign policy issues?
Answer – The crisis-related processes in Ukraine naturally impacted on Georgia both economically and politically. For example, because of the crisis and hostilities Georgian exports to this country have significantly been reduced. The appointmentsof the former ruling party of Georgia, including wanted individuals,to senior positions in the Ukrainian government have causedchiller bilateral relations. Some circles in Georgia believe that the newly appointed head of the Odessa Region, Mikhail Saakashvili and his United National Movement party are trying to use the "Ukrainian trump card" to return to power. With regard to the foreign policy aspects, the events in Ukraine are projected on the whole of the post-Soviet space to a certain extent, since they are seen as manifestation of the geopolitical confrontation between the West and Russia for influence in this space. Georgia has found itself in a difficult position. On the one hand, as a strategic ally of the United States and an entity striving for the Euro-Atlantic structures, it follows the Ukraine-related political mainstream designed by the West. On the other hand, the Georgian leadership is trying not to irritate Moscowas much as possible, and therefore avoids an overly harsh assessment of the Russian actions in Ukraine, often to the detriment of its image in the West. The Georgian leadership has tried to encourage the West to consider the territorial problems of Ukraine and Georgia in one package of negotiations with Russia. But it doesn’t seem to have reached any significant progress. In terms of the impact of Ukrainian processes on Georgia in the foreseeable future, I think a lot will depend on the agreements among the United States, the EU and Russia. Whether Russia will manage to get out of the Ukrainian crisis saving its face and with satisfied strategic interests, or it will be defeated, will largely determine its behavior towards Georgia.
- What are the main domestic and foreign policy challenges to Georgia at the moment? What credit of confidence is the Georgian Dream enjoying today?
Answer – There are several domestic policy challenges.
One of them is the extremely high level of polarization of the society in terms of the political, outlook, and value systems, which, in case of increased tension, may pour out into a civil conflict.
The weak integration of ethnic minorities into a united national state and the strengthened centrifugal moods in the regions of their residence can be considered another challenge.
The incompleteness of institutional reforms and electoral reforms could be named as another domestic policy challenge, which is quite topical in light of the Parliamentary elections in 2016.
Among the domestic political challenges I would mention the deterioration of the socio-economic situation in the country, related primarily to the devaluation of the national currency - the Lari. The government had to reduce the projected economic growth of 5% to 2%. The deterioration of the economic situation, of course,is not financially beneficial for the citizens, causing social and political protests. This resulted in the undermining of confidence in the ruling Georgian Dreamcoalition. Compared with the survey in April last year, a survey conductedthis April showed that the rating of the power has dropped from 48% to 24%.
Another domestic political challenge, I assume, is the unresolved question of the restoration of justice associated with the restoration of the property, financial, political and other rights of the citizens, are the mass violations that happened under the previous regime. The public demands from the ruling military coalition to fully fulfill the promises made during the campaign, to identify and punish the guilty representatives of the former government. The ruling coalition has not yet been very successful in this. Delays in this process can serve as a catalyst for the unpredictable processes, given that up to 50,000 people have filed lawsuits and statements to the prosecutor's office, demanding justice.
The foreign policy challenges are mainly related to the problems of regional security, the unresolved relations with Russia, and the dangers posed by this against the background of the events in Ukraine, with the desire to restore the Russian influence in the former Soviet Union. A long-lasting foreign policy challenge is that Georgia, not being a member of any military-political alliance, is in a very vulnerable position. Despite some progress towards integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, including the signing of the association agreement with the EU,there is a long and difficult way to go in this regard. And in this way new challenges may arise.
Artak Barseghyan, Public Radio of Armenia,www.armradio.am
- In the recent years, the influence of Azerbaijani and Turkish political circles has been growing in Georgia. In this context do you think it likely to change the current atmosphere of relations between Tbilisi and Yerevan?
Answer - Turkey and Azerbaijan, which are also geographically the neighbors of Georgia, are its important, if not strategic partners in economy. Suffice it to mention, such international projects as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Shah Deniz oil-pipes, as well as the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway project. Georgia receives a greater share of energy from Azerbaijan. It is connected with Turkey by the Kars Treaty. We could mention other areas of cooperation, too, which promote the growth of the influence of these countries. But I think that the extent of this influence is not as high as it is often described in the Armenian media. Tbilisi assesses the situation quite pragmatically, and I do not think that, given the increase of cooperation with Baku and Ankara, the current level of our country's relations with Armenia will drop. They will remain stable, and I assume that it is in the interests of both countries due to the well-known circumstances.
- After Mikhail Saakashvili left the Georgian proscenium there has been some warming of Russian-Georgian relations. What are the prospects of these relations?
Answer - I have partly answered that question already. Yes, after the change of the government the degree of tension in the Russian-Georgian relations has fallen to some extent. Some reciprocal steps have been made, mainly in the trade, economic and humanitarian areas. The Russian market has opened for a range of Georgian products, scientific and cultural exchanges have intensified. However, the prospects of bilateral relations, including the restoration of diplomatic and good neighborly relations, are directly dependent on the de-occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Russia’s withdrawal to recognize them. Russia must implement the provisions of the Medvedev-Sarkozy agreement, and return to the pre- August 8, 2008 situation.
- Many believe the real leader of Georgia is Bidzina Ivanishvili. What is the real influence this oligarch has on the policy pursued byTbilisi?
Answer - I can only say that his influence on the political processes in Georgia is really significant. The government and the parliamentary majority of the ruling coalition Georgian Dream consider Bidzina Ivanishvili’s opinion on a number of topical issues, and they do not particularly hide that fact.
Karine Asatryan, www.a1plus.am
- How does the relationship with Armenia rank on Georgia's foreign policy agenda, and can our country pretend to become a strategic partner for Georgia?
Answer – The relations with Armenia have always occupied and will always occupy their rightful place in the foreign policy agenda of Georgia at least due to the geographical proximity, historical bilateral relations and problems commonly shared in South Caucasus. At least the fact that an impressive number of Armenians live inGeorgia determines the importance of these relations. With regard to the strategic partnership, many factorsneed to be taken into account. Armenia is, perhaps, the only strategic partner to Russia in the region, a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, while Georgia is a strategic partner to the United States, and this was established by the Charter on Strategic Partnership. Georgia aspires to Euro-Atlantic structures, while Armenia is joining the Eurasian Union. Based on the foregoing, it is difficult to predict how probable it is for Armenia to become a strategic partner of Georgia in the classical sense of the term in the foreseeable future. However, the mutually beneficial cooperation on strategic issues is quite possible and in fact, it is happening at the moment.
David Stepanyan, www.arminfo.am
- What, in your opinion, can Georgia expect from the final declaration of the Riga Summit with all its 30 provisions? And are the differences between the European prospects of Armenia and Georgia so very significant after Riga?
Answer - I think the main thing is to build realistic expectations and to look at the European prospects, not only from our own bell towers, but from the perspective of the EU. As it has been repeatedly pointed out by the senior representatives of the EU prior to, during and after the Riga Summit, the issue of promoting the European integration of the Eastern Partnership member states is highly dependent on the "political dimension". I'd like to add that when finding solutions the so-called "Real politics" is the determining factor. It largely influenced the content and the pathos of the final declaration of the Riga summit, which dominantly contained cautious and streamline wording about the European prospect, even for the most advanced countries of the Eastern Partnership (Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia). Due to the well-known reasons, Armenia is not very active regarding its integration with the EU and within the Eastern Partnership. However, despite that the EU's doors are not closed before it in the case of a reorientation of foreign policy priorities, the existing asymmetry in the European prospects can be quickly overcome.
- Officials in Yerevan and Tbilisi have habitually declaredof the lack of problems in the relations between the two countries after Armenia’sjoining the EEU. In your opinion, is this view any different from the actual reality?
Answer - It will depend on many factors, including the political and economic conditions at both regional and international scales. As I mentioned above, Tbilisi and Yerevan have a very pragmatic approach to bilateral relations, and I do not think that Armenia's accession to the EEU will seriously complicate the bilateral relations. There may be economic problems, but they can be solved with good will and due to common interests. If we manage to reach an agreement on maintaining access for the EU associated countries to the EEU market, these problems can be minimized.
- In contrast to the authorities of Georgia in the times of Mikheil Saakashvili, the new authorities of the country have gradually taken up the Russia-orientedvector in the foreign policy with the support of the Georgian Orthodox Church. Some Georgian colleagues attribute this to the use of soft power by Moscow towards Russia. Can you please share your vision on this policy?
Answer - I do not agree with the statement that after the change of power, the new power in Georgia are deploying the pro-Russian foreign policy vector, and that the Orthodox Church supports them. If this were true, Georgia would not have signed an association agreement with the EU and would refuse to sign the final declaration at the Riga summit; it would not agree to the opening of a NATO training center in its territory, and would not have organized the recent large-scale military exercises jointly with the United States. Instead of all this it would have made overtures towards Moscow.
The desire of the Georgian leadership to reduce tensions with Russia and build equal relations with it does not at all mean a revision of the established foreign policy priorities. The fact that Moscow is using the so-called "soft power"in Georgia and in the former Soviet Unionin general is not news to anyone. Yes, after the change of power, Russia was given more opportunities to conduct an information dissemination, propagandaand outreach through local pro-Russian non-governmental organizations and the media, and to fully restore the broadcasting of their social and political TV channels. And I must admit that it has yielded results. But I personally see this as a healthy process of democratic pluralism, which implies competition ideology, value systems, and political platforms. There is no need to turn the Russian soft power intoa scare-crow and give it an exaggerated importance. However, vigilance should not weaken either.
Tatev Harutyunyan, www.aravot.am
- What is the delay of Georgia's membership to NATO caused by? In a joint press conference with the President of Estonia Toomas Hendrik Ilves in Tbilisi Georgian President G. Margvelashvili said that the agenda of Georgia's membership to NATO is not yet formed, Georgia needs reforms.
Answer - Yes, NATO is not fixed the time for the official start to the process of Georgia's integration into thealliance. An indicator of the start should be the provision of the Georgia Membership Action Plan (MAP). However, the international environment is not yet conducive to this.
Russia's tough stance on the issue, the protracted crisis in Ukraine, the two unresolved ethnic and regional conflicts in the territory of Georgia, the economic situation in the country, lack of standards and quality of institutional and policy reforms, internal contradictions within NATO regarding the timing of the next phase of expansion and the inclusion of post-Soviet countries: all of these make up the non-exhaustive list of reasons that hinder Georgia's integration into NATO. However, the provision in the final declaration of the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008 is still valid that Georgia and Ukraine will become members of the Alliance.
- How would you comment on the statement made by the governor of Odessa Mikhail Saakashvili that after the coup, Ukraine has become the poorest country in Europe, and that the country has a long way to go to get back to the level of two years ago, to the levels in the time of Viktor Yanukovych?
Answer - Unfortunately, I have not read that statement the incumbent governor of Odessa, and without exploring its exact content, it is difficult to comment on that statement. And the fact that after the Maidan revolution and the subsequent events underlying it, the socio-economic situation in Ukraine has deteriorated sharply is not a secret to anyone.
- Will the flood in Tbilisi have an impact on the political life of the country, if so, how might this occur?
Answer – We should still evaluate how correctly and in compliance with the standards the infrastructure facilities weredesigned and built under the previous government and which did not resist the flood disaster.
The need for raising the issue of criminal responsibility for a number of senior officials in the former government is not excluded: this may trigger a new round of political tension. In the days of the flood and the tragic events, the formerly ruling United National Movement party organized a campaign against the government through controlled media outlets and their own supporters in an attempt to raise the degree of the political tension in the country, to create anti-governmental moods and provoke political unrest among the public. However, this did not lead to the expected results. So far, I do not foresee any political complications, if the authorities do not make fatal errors.
Emil Babayan, EurAsia Daily, www.eadaily.com
- How do you evaluate the internal political processes in Georgia on the eve of parliamentary elections in 2016; what changes in the political landscapecan be expected (what are the chances of the parliamentary forces: the Dream Team, “Saakashvili's party" and the “Alliance" parties, as well as the extra-parliamentary opposition)?
Answer - According to public opinion polls, (no matter who did those and for what purpose, they do more or less reflect the public moods) there is a growing number of disillusioned voters. Their number ranges from 30-40%, which is quite an impressive figure. It can be assumed that, given the dropped rating of the ruling Georgian Dream coalition and the maintenance of the almost unchanged ratings of the main opposition forces a new political force will come afore. I do not exclude the possibility thatthose members and supporters of the National Movement, not mired in criminal acts and not addressed major complaints, will claim to be the new force. Now such movements are being made in this wing of the political spectrum of Georgia. As you know, recently the National Movement was left by four of its prominent members who founded a new political organization. IberiaCivil Movement, consisting of senior officials who served in the government of Saakashvili, announced its participation in the elections. As the elections approach, we may be witnessing the emergence of new alliances and new political players.
- How would you characterize the last NATO summit in Wales and its results? What should Georgia expect from the summit in Warsaw in 2016?
Answer - Describing the NATO summit in Wales and its results concerning Georgia, I would like to quote NATO Special Representative for the South Caucasus and Central Asia James Appathurai: "More of NATO in Georgia, more of Georgia in NATO."
Despite the fact that Georgia did not receive the coveted MAP at the summit, it received the so-called "Gold Package" for cooperation, involving among other cooperation measures, the establishment ofaNATOtraining and assessment center in the territory of Georgia. This, you see, is a qualitatively new stage of cooperation, coupled with the existing formats. To my knowledge, at the NATO summit in Warsaw, we cannot exclude the possibility of providing Georgia with a Membership Action Plan to NATO.
- Georgia - EU. What's next? Will Georgia receive a visa-free regime with the EU, and are there prospects for membership as of today? How does the current situation on this issue reflect on Georgian domestic policies, once again, in the context of the upcoming elections?
Answer - The relations between Georgia and the EU are now largely determined by the agenda of the agreement between Georgia and the EU, and the requirements established there are gradually being implemented. This means that the country is gradually approaching the value and institutional norms that exist in the EU, which is very important for the development of Georgia as a European state. At the Riga summit, the Georgian delegation received assurances from the EU that in case of successful completion of the remainder of the plan regarding liabilities forvisa liberalization and taking into account the progress already made by Georgia, the country is likely to get visa liberalization with the EU in 2016. This will give the citizens of Georgia the right to visa-free entry and stay in the EU for 90 days. However, due to "real-politics", the EU is in no hurry to give Georgia any prospect of EU membership. The Riga summit has not gone beyond the mere recognition of the European aspirations of Georgia, while the Georgian delegation expected that the final summit declaration would at least fix the recognition of Georgia's European prospects. But whatever the provision, the mechanism of the rapprochement between Georgia and the EU has been "launched". The Eastern Partnership programme, with all its flaws, will continue to act as an EU geopolitical instrument.
Naturally, the EU policy to keep Georgia at a certain distance for the time being, causes anxiety and frustration among the vast majority of the Georgian society, which has resulted in a growing number of the so-called "Eurosceptics". This has led to the strengthened positions of the political forces in the national-patriotic platform and those who are equally distancing themselves from the West and Russia.
The issue of foreign policy orientation, I believe, will be one of the key elements in the forthcoming electoral battles.
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