WHO EMERGED AS THE “NEW” PRESIDENT OF AZERBAIJAN FOLLOWING THE ELECTIONS WITH A HOLIDAY TWIST

Laura Baghdasaryan, Director of ''Region'' Research Center

On February 7, following snap elections held within a two-month period (December 7, 2023 - February 7, 2024), Ilham Aliyev was elected as the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan for the fifth consecutive term, securing over 92% of the votes.

Aliyev is to lead the country until February 2031, unless he opts for another early election prior to the conclusion of his term, which is what happened last time (the 2018 elections were also held ahead of schedule). As per 2009 referendum and subsequent legislative amendments, the restriction on re-election of a single leader for more than two terms had been lifted, thus enabling Aliyev to remain at the helm for over 20 years, since his election in 2003. Aliyev has become the enduring successor to his father, Heydar Aliyev, while the Aliyev dynasty has been holding power in Azerbaijan since 1993, totaling 30 years of rule.     
Much like in all previous presidential elections involving Aliyev (2003, 2008, 2013, and 2018), in the current election the question of “who will win?” was devoid of suspense.
With Aliyev in office, elections have never come to a second round, nor has he ever been closely challenged by another candidate, consistently securing the presidency of Azerbaijan with a significant lead in votes compared to his “rivals”. The involvement of the other presidential contenders primarily served the formality of securing Aliyev's re-election for the next term, giving the public the appearance of competitive elections with alternative candidates, while also conveying a distinct formal message to international observers regarding his legitimacy within Azerbaijani society.
This time, alongside Aliyev, 6 more candidates participated in the February elections. 4 out of 6 were MPs, members of the Milli Mejlis (Razi Nurullayev from the “National Front Party”, Gudrat Hasanguliyev from the “Whole Azerbaijan Popular Front Party”, Fazil Mustafa from the “Great Order Party”, as well as Zahid Oruj, MP. The remaining two candidates - Elshad Musayev from the “Great Azerbaijan Party” and the former head of the “Liberal Democratic Party” Fuad Aliyev - are not MPs.

Additional statistical data suggests that the current team of Aliyev's contenders possess prior experience in running against him in presidential election races. 5 out of 6 candidates (excluding Elshad Musayev) have become alternative presidential candidates in varying frequencies, ranging from one to all five elections. The most experienced in this sense is Gudrat Hasanguliyev, who has been trying to become AR president since 2003.

Another shared characteristic among all alternative candidates is their unwavering support for the current president Aliyev, particularly regarding his stance on the Karabakh conflict and reconciliation with Armenia. Notably, none of them has openly criticized him on these matters. During their campaign speeches, they referred to Aliyev as a man of integrity who kept his promise and “brought back Karabakh.” Throughout the campaign, they advocated for Aliyev, arguing that all renowned Azerbaijani figures would also endorse him for presidency. This led many in Azerbaijan to question why other candidates would commend Aliyev in their own electoral speeches.

I. Aliyev refrained from engaging in the election campaign and chose not to participate in the 6 debates involving the candidates, organized by the Public Television of Azerbaijan.

The electoral intrigue lies in the absence thereof 

Merely 1 month after revealing the rescheduling of his re-election bid from 2025 to a year and three months earlier, the mystery persisted: what prompted I. Aliyev's call for early elections?

It was perhaps the only suspense around the February elections in Azerbaijan. The question captured the attention of not only Azerbaijani figures and experts (none of whom, including the representatives of the current government, could provide a definitive answer for over a month) but also foreign colleagues. Various interpretations and versions were proposed through collective endeavors, encompassing geopolitical perspectives related to the region, broader international considerations, and internal dynamics. “The euphoria of victory has faded”, however, the socio-economic challenges, and particularly issues concerning freedoms within the country, have persisted and deteriorated leading up to 2024. International organizations and a number of Western information platforms highlighted increased restrictions on dissent and repression against independent media in Azerbaijan in the run-up to the presidential elections.

In January, I. Aliyev personally clarified his decision, stating that the first elections following the “restoration of the country's territorial integrity” should be presidential in nature. Furthermore, there was a perceived need to mark the conclusion of his two-decade-long tenure, dedicated entirely to addressing this issue. Subsequently, Azerbaijani speakers, both domestically and internationally, began referring to these elections as historic “Victory Elections”, framing support for Aliyev as an expression of gratitude for “Karabakh”.

“On a personal note, both myself and numerous persons within my circle are inclined towards attending these significant elections, which are to be held across the whole territory of Azerbaijan for the first time. Secondly, we aim to express gratitude to the President of Azerbaijan for Karabakh and cast our votes in the ballot box,” stated E. Namazov, a former assistant to Heydar Aliyev and a political analyst. He interpreted the decision of opposition forces to abstain from participating in the elections as a “wise move” given the circumstances. The opposition representatives, much like in the 2018 snap elections, voiced their discontent with the abruptness of the election announcement and the consequent lack of adequate preparation time.
 

Debates on the transparency and democratic nature of the elections 

The key message of the 2024 elections to the international community was generating the illusion that they were free, transparent and competitive and extended to also include “Karabakh”. 

Following the elimination of even the geographical designation “Nagorno-Karabakh” and the inclusion of the region populated by Armenian residents until September 2023 into the Karabakh Economic Region (2021), it became common in Azerbaijan to refer to it simply as Karabakh.

Throughout the elections, the AR Central Election Commission specifically emphasized the number of operational polling stations and registered voters in the “liberated” regions. Notably, it reported of “approximately 23 thousand voters in Karabakh.” This information found its way into the news feeds of various foreign media, potentially fostering a misleading impression among international audiences who may not have been fully aware or engaged with the realities on the ground, hinting at the possibility of unimpeded voting within this conflict-stricken region (inhabited by Armenians until September 2023).

Moreover, M. Panakhov, Chairman of the Central Election Commission of Azerbaijan, stated that “this includes the soldiers carrying out their military service there and other eligible individuals residing in these territories” and that “individuals of Armenian descent have the opportunity to participate in the elections.” This statement by the head of the Central Election Commission received widespread coverage in the media, within Azerbaijan and beyond. Apart from being fundamentally racist, it aimed to support the aforementioned propagandistic agenda. Once again, it added to the narrative that in Karabakh, there aren’t just a few Armenians who stayed after the forced exodus of local Armenians, but rather an entire “Armenian population”, which was granted democratic rights to elections.

I. Aliyev voted in Stepanakert, thereby consolidating the symbolic importance of victory and the conduct of elections also in Nagorno-Karabakh.

A total of 800 foreign observers from the OSCE/ODIHR, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Russia, and various other nations and organizations monitored the election process in Azerbaijan. At the post-election press conference, the OSCE/ODIHR was the only organization to voice concerns regarding the lack of competitiveness in the elections, the integrity of the voting process, and the presence of irregularities such as “signs of ballot stuffing” and instances of multiple voting. Օther foreign observers, including Russian experts S. Markov and I. Korotchenko, known for their biased perspectives, provided favorable evaluations of the elections. Namely, Korotchenko went as far as to suggest that the Azerbaijani elections set a standard worth emulating even in countries like France, whose leader can only envy the popular support enjoyed by Aliyev in Azerbaijan.

S. Lebedev, the Secretary General of the CIS and the head of its observation mission, characterized the elections in Azerbaijan as the most transparent within the post-Soviet space. He underscored that the re-election of Aliyev for a fifth term reflected his established authority, cautioning at the same time against sensationalizing this outcome or using it as grounds for criticism.

Representatives from Azerbaijan's opposition parties (the “Azerbaijani Popular Front Party” (APFP), “Musavat”, and the “Democratic Party of Azerbaijan”) strongly opposed the assertion that the elections genuinely reflect the people's will. They argued that the elections had been held amidst widespread suppression of rights and freedoms, instilling an atmosphere of fear and intimidation.

In the midst of the election campaign, a scandal broke out in PACE following the suspension of the Azerbaijani delegation's powers within this organization. In its official statement, the Azerbaijani delegation leveled accusations against PACE, alleging double standards and attempts to interfere with the electoral proceedings.

Specifically, they pointed out that over the course of 19 years, “PACE refrained from criticizing Armenia, the occupying state, for actions violating the fundamental values and principles of the Council of Europe. This disregard directly impacts the rights of Azerbaijani refugees and internally displaced persons who have suffered from ethnic cleansing.” The statement further read that the Azerbaijani delegation considered “… this initiative as a deliberate and unacceptable attempt to interfere with Azerbaijan's electoral processes, serving as a vivid example of covert effort to undermine democratic institutions within the country.”

PACE, in turn, cited several reasons in its decision to suspend the authorities of the Azerbaijani delegation, namely, Azerbaijan's refusal to allow an observation mission from the organization for the elections, the growing number of political detainees in Azerbaijan, the forced displacement of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, and PACE representatives being denied entry to Azerbaijan on at least three occasions in 2023 (including also the period of nearly 9-month blockade of the Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan).
 

This is the first piece in a series planned within the framework of the “Armenian-Azerbaijani Context in the Presidential Elections of Azerbaijan and Russia - 2024” Project of the “Region” Research Center.

Publication of this material is supported by Democracy Development Foundation. The opinions and positions expressed in the material may not reflect the views and positions of Democracy Development Foundation.