Agendas and New Algorithms of Policies in the South Caucasus - 2023: Turkey

Russia Takes Turkey on Board to Balance West’s Role

Hasan Selim Ozertem, political analyst

- In the context of Turkey's current interests, what is the significance of the post-war Armenian-Azerbaijani developments? What prospects and potential threats lie for Turkey in this context?

After the ceasefire agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020, Turkey became engaged in the conflict, because at the moment Turkey has a mission in the Karabakh region. With Russians they are trying to observe the ongoing peace mission over there. But apart from this, Turkey has been engaging in regional development, particularly with Azerbaijan and Georgia for the last three decades. And this ceasefire agreement also paves the way for further prospects for regional development that will also include Armenia. But for this purpose, we need further advances, which will be paving the way for the peace process and maybe for a long-lasting peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia. But even with this ceasefire agreement, we see a dialogue process starting between Turkey and Armenia. The initial step was letting or allowing flights once again between Armenia and Turkey. Second, non-nationals of Armenia and Turkey now can pass via the land border between these two countries. Three decades later, for the first time, the land border seems to be functioning, and I believe that the recent diplomacy in the aftermath of the earthquake, which Armenia took and initiated, sending humanitarian assistance to Turkey, and the Armenian Foreign Minister visiting Turkey also gave another momentum for the normalization of talks between Armenia and Turkey. Without a ceasefire, without the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied territories, such a dialogue was not viable before 2022. In this regard, the ongoing dialogue and the post-conflict or the post ceasefire agreement process is one of the critical phases in Turkish foreign policy towards its expectations in the Southern Caucasus.

- How does the Russian-Turkish rapprochement of recent years affect the agendas of various countries and international organizations involved in the South Caucasus, as well as the agendas of the parties to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict? Which countries benefit the most from this rapprochement?

Turkey-Russia relations normalized in 2016, during the coup d'etat attempt in Turkey. And in the aftermath of this normalization process, we see a revitalization of economic affairs, tourism and also energy affairs between Russia and Turkey. TurkStream was the concrete step, and another step was the resume of the nuclear power plant project. But another important aspect is the recent collaboration between Russia and Turkey in the regional conflicts. The first and most important thing was the Syrian war. In line with the Astana process, Turkey, Russia and Iran attempted to collaborate for the first time in a regional conflict as regional actors. And I believe that Turkey and Russia managed to develop a dialogue based on mutual understanding and trust.

The special dialogue between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and President Vladimir Putin was critical because such a dialogue was beyond the institutional. It was tried to be established in pre-2015 crisis, after Turkey took down the Russian jet in November 2015. Before, there were attempts to establish some institutional frameworks, but what we see in the post-2016 period, the dialogue between Putin and Erdoğan mattered more. Coming to the Caucasus, I believe such dialogue also worked in the aftermath of 2020. In this regard, for the first time, Turkish and Russian militaries are working on a peace mission beyond the auspices of the United Nations. So this is a critical issue. And now the parties are also discussing 3+3 mechanism, which will include Iran, Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia, to discuss further developments and produce stability in the region. But there are still limitations over there because the current dynamics in the region are beyond the mutual understanding between Russia and Turkey. What we see at the moment is increasing tension between Iran and Azerbaijan, and tension between Georgia and Russia. We are expecting to see a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This dialogue is functioning and I believe it will at least keep the tension down.

Regarding Ukraine, it is more related to the dynamics in the Black Sea than in the South Caucasus. For a long time, Turkey tried to keep third countries, non-regional countries outside of the Black Sea dynamics, having concerns about the change of status quo established after the Montreux agreements. Based on the Montreux agreements of 1936, Turkey became the main controller, the main power of the Turkish Straits (Dardanelles and Bosphorus.). This gives leverage to Turkey. By having this kind of memorandum, it also controls exits and entrances to the Black Sea. This is a kind of safety mechanism for Russian foreign policy, because without directly confronting the third countries, Russia can easily pursue the mechanism being functioned by Turkey itself. So in this regard, the status quo could be managed to be maintained for about nine decades now or so.

But in the 2008 war, Russia started to bring back the change of the status quo. In the Ukrainian war, Turkey acted really cautiously and established a balanced affair with Kyiv and Moscow. And this helps Turkey to play a facilitator role in finding solutions for some problems, like keeping the green corridor, keeping the dialogue between Kyiv and Moscow over Istanbul, or Ankara open. This helps Turkey to increase its economic affairs with Ukraine and Russia as well. Let me give you some statistics from 2022. Turkish trade volume with Russia peaked at 68 billion dollars. This was $31 billion in 2021. And one of the main reasons for this increase is definitely the increase of the prices of oil and gas. But also Turkish exports to Russia have peaked at almost $10 billion, which was not seen before in history. Turkey also took advantage of this dynamic. But as coming to your question, who took advantage of this dialogue, and whose interests were undermined, I believe, while Turkey and Russia, develop a closer relationship, this limits great powers' access to the region. In the post-2020 periods, we see the Minsk process losing its importance, Moscow acting as a mediator in finding a solution between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Turkey becoming the representative of the West, which has as closer dialogue as a NATO member with Russia. In the aftermath of the ceasefire, the access of the United States or European countries was limited. Still, the EU took the initiative for a solution to the border conflicts between the parties in 2022. The initiative also faced difficulties in the absence of strong support from the Kremlin. We may say that there are two important regional countries, Turkey and Russia, that play a critical role in the region. Coming to the Black Sea, Turkey's role in the Black Sea also limited the access of Western countries during the war between Russia and Ukraine. This also limited the access of the Russian Navy to the Baltic or Pacific Navy bases. In this regard, Turkey's role can be defined as a balancing actor. And Russia takes Turkey on board, maybe to balance the West's role, which also serves Moscow's interests, considering the regional dynamics.

- Do you consider the Armenian-Azerbaijani contradictions to be the main obstacle to establishing long-term stability in the South Caucasus region? What are the circumstances for such a prospect to become a reality?

In the last three decades, Armenia could have become a part of these regional development projects. We see new pipeline projects building glades, from Caspian to Turkish Jehan port or Turkish-Greek borders. Plus we see the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway system constructed, which opened a new gateway in the East-West direction, giving access to a route lying from China to London. And also we see a kind of, lively trade momentum gained between Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey. But in the last three decades, Armenia was isolated, and this is not helping to healthy regional developments.  As conflict continues, it undermines the foreign direct investments in the region. This undermines the potential of regional collaboration between the regional countries. But once this conflict is left behind, I believe there is great potential for regional developments to take momentum further.

At the moment, we are talking about opening the land border. But this land border would be open to third parties. What we need is a mobilization between Turkish and Armenian societies. At the moment, Turkish goods have to pass via the corridor of Georgia to reach Armenia. This increases transportation costs. This increases the costs of trade between West and Armenia. Opening the borders between Armenia and Turkey will decrease the costs that will further help the trade to be expanded in the region. But what is the main problem over here? 2020 agreement has some loopholes. One of them is the undefined status of the Karabakh region. What will be the status of Karabakh if the peace process is agreed between the parties? There are some expectations regarding the Lachin and Zangezour corridors. Recently, due to the problems between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the attention escalated in the Lachin Corridor. The Lachin Corridor is blocked by Azerbaijan, and this undermines food and energy security in Karabakh.

And such attention is not helping a peace process to move forward. Coming to Zangezour Corridor, in the ceasefire agreement of 2020 there was an expectation of a corridor to be opened between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan. But this corridor also could not be established in the last two and a half years. Both parties want to open some channels to the autonomous regions or to the communities which are blockaded within the line plot formations. But due to the border and Karabakh status disagreements, the peace process cannot gain momentum. There is also another issue going on. We see tension increasing between Iran and Azerbaijan. This also undermines the stability and prospect for further developments in the region. These two regional tensions, plus the sanctions imposed on Russia, undermines regional developments to be continued, but the main pillar of these disagreements, particularly for the Turkey-Armenia normalization process, is the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

- Officially, Turkey always voices its support for Azerbaijan's actions against Armenia and the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh. Are there alternative viewpoints in Turkey now regarding the methods of pressure used by Azerbaijan? Could the forthcoming presidential elections in Turkey, along with the potential shift of power, alter this situation?

We should note that Turkey did not close the border lines under the acting party governments. The border was closed in 1990s, when there was another government in Turkey. Turkey not only established economic relations with Azerbaijan, but also in parallel contributed to the modernization of the Azerbaijani army and has maintained this partnership since then. Turkey-Azerbaijan relations is one of the main axes of Turkish foreign policy. So it is hard to expect a radical shift if another government comes to power. It should be noted that in 2009, Armenia and Turkey wanted to take steps further for normalization process, but this process also undermined due to Baku's reaction. In this regard, we need to note that not only Turkey's strategic vision but also Azerbaijan's engagement with Turkey in the post-2000 period, particularly in economic and political terms somehow affects the Turkish foreign policy. I had a chance to look at a common policy, the tax memorandum prepared by the Table of Six, led by the main opposition party, CHP. In this text, these six parties (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, İYİ Parti, Demokrat Parti, Saadet Partisi, Demokrasi ve Atılım Partisi, Gelecek Partisi) noted down that the normalization process between Armenia and Turkey will go on. There is also an embracement of the current policy of normalization between Armenia and Turkey. Also, there is another emphasis on looking at the normalization process in the Caucasian region. Some further courageous steps can be continued to be taken. But it is hard to ignore the fact that Azerbaijan's position and the current regional conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan will play an important role in shaping Turkey's approach towards Armenia.

- In your opinion, what and who (what countries, organizations) can achieve that Azerbaijan stops the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh residents, which has been taking place for over 110 days? According to you, what are the main expectations of Azerbaijan from the blockade, and what has Azerbaijan achieved today?

I believe that the most important country over here is Armenia itself. Nikol Pashinyan, for a long time, showed an important political viewpoint, that he is ready to find a solution. But we see that there are ongoing protests each and every time Nikol Pashinyan wants to take steps further. Similarly, Russia can play another important role, because while Russia, trying to keep the status quo or stability in the region, also looks for a viable solution to keep the regional dynamics intact while keeping Russian dominance in the region. There are also limitations of the West, maneuvres in the last two-and-a-half-year period. Russia also has some political views to find the solution because an escalation of tension in the region will also endanger Russia’s interests in the Ukrainian war, its interests in the Syrian and maybe even in the Libyan conflicts. After all, Russia also is overwhelmed with the ongoing conflicts in its neighborhoods and in the region. Another escalation or reignition of another regional conflict in the South Caucasus will undermine its interests.

The third country is Turkey itself. The normalization process of Armenia and Turkey relations also is a good incentive to show that normalization serves the interests of the regional actors, and plus the societies of Armenia and Turkey. But, Turkey also has its own limitations considering Armenia's, Azerbaijan's, and Russia's positions to the conflict itself. It's hard to ignore the catalyst role of the European Union and the United Nations. I define them as catalyst roles, because it seems that an agreement is hardly viable under the leadership of Brussels, or Washington for the time being. What are the risks ahead? In 2020, when the ceasefire agreement was signed, there were five years for peacekeeping forces to remain in the conflict zone. As we come closer to 2025, the status of Russian forces and the ceasefire agreement will be open to discussions. Before discussing these issues, the parties should be also looking for finding a solution at the first level to the border disagreements, and then maybe finding a way for a peace agreement for long-lasting stability in the region.
Azerbaijan is trying to put pressure on the Karabakh Armenians. Via Karabakh Armenians it wants to change the position of Yerevan, because the ones who are suffering at the moment are the people living in Artsakh. Karabakh Armenians have problems in accessing energy, food, medical resources, etc. Their suffering will be reflected.

Series of interviews "Agendas and New Algorithms of Policies in the South Caucasus - 2023" has been organized within the framework of the Region Research Center's project "New Agendas for Peace and Stability in the South Caucasus after the Karabakh 2020 War". The project is being implemented with the support of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation. The opinions expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the opinions and positions of the Black See Trust for Regional Cooperation or its partners.