Possibilities and Understanding of the Karabakh Conflict Resolution 25 Years after the Ceasefire : Page 3 of 10

of the Armenian sides has really toughened. The mainstream idea currentlyheld in Armenia is that Armenians have no real partner for negotiations. While in Azerbaijan, the strategy is built around a combination of a non-substantive negotiation process with attempts to weaken Armenia and NKR through various activities.

Sergey Markedonov - How do the parties understand the settlement? As the triumph of their own "truth," just like before. This is the public perception of the situation. Compromises are perceived as a weakness,to put it mildly, and almost as a betrayal. Hence a question arises: why even negotiate if there is no desire and will to reverse the existing trends? No such will, truly. But not only put up with it, but also to fight it. The Armenian side feels that it is the beneficiary of the status quo. It does not need military shocks. The Azerbaijani side, on the contrary, does not like the status quo. But Baku understands that complete “defrosting” of the conflict is a costly enterprise. The war will write off a lot, but only in case of a victory. And what if ....? The experience of Mutalibov and Elchibey is too eloquent. Defeats entail the threat of losing power. Hence, the rejection of radical tactics, the desire to supplement coercive pressure with diplomatic pressure, the unwillingness to look like, first of all, “war-mongers”to the world and mediators. Hence, there are no resources for a final victory, but there is no readiness to seek a compromise either.
On the Link between N. Pashinyan’s High Legitimacy and the Settlement of the Karabakh Conflict

Sergey Markedonov - Over the past year I have participated in many international fora dedicated to the Karabakh settlement. The leitmotif has been as follows: for the first time in many years a legitimate power has come afore in Armenia, the new Prime Minister NikolPashinyanenjoys massive support and popularity. Consequently, the solution to the conflict is not far off, because a power that enjoys public support can afford concessions and compromises. Theoretically, this just looks beautiful! But in practice, the society that we have in Armenia today does not give Pashinyan a mandate to make concessions, much less a “surrender of positions” (and any compromise is taken with apprehension). And it will not give it in the foreseeable future. This explains the toughening of positions by the country's leadership that has been noted by many.

Alexander Iskandaryan - To put it politely,the thesis about the direct impact of the domestic legitimacy of the government on the process seems somewhat caricatureto me. Firstly, because the duration of the format for the settlement of the Karabakh conflictis fundamentally longer than the legitimacy of any government, this kind of conflict cannot be resolved simply by the will of any people who come to power, legitimate or not.It is not a personal issue. It is possible to mess it up, yet it is impossible to settle it. And the second point is that very often the masses from the generalpublic are more radical than the leaders. A change of leaders, especially in