Varvara Pakhomenko
Analyst
Украина
Online press conference with Varvara Pakhomenko, analyst at International Crisis Group.
Armen Minasyan (Armenia)
Panorama.am
Question:
Do you think the recent rapprochement in the Russian-Turkish relations will lead to geopolitical changes in South and North Caucasus?
Answer:
Against the background of aggravated relations between the West, and both Russia and Turkey, we can really observe some intensification of contacts between Ankara and Moscow on a number of issues. Russia and Turkey have obvious areas for cooperation. In particular, these are the issues of ensuring security in connection with the conflict in Syria and Iraq. To date, the number of Russian citizens in the forces of the "Islamic State" (ISIS) and other organizations that fight against the governments of these countries, estimated by the representatives of the Russian law enforcement agencies, ranges from 2 to 5 thousand. Most of these people are from North Caucasus, especially from its eastern regions - Dagestan, Chechnya. As far as we know, most of them get to Syria via Turkey. The Russian authorities view the threat from ISIS as a very serious one, in particular fearing the return of the militant to their homeland and the probability of their joining the armed underground forces here. Likewise, it is necessary to keep track of those who leave Russia, some can even be stopped in Turkey as recently happened in the case of a student from Moscow VarvaraKaraulova. To respond to these challenges it is necessary to ensure cooperation among the countries in the region – not only between Turkey and Russia, but also cooperation with Georgia, which has faced a similar problem. At the same time, we wish we could hope that the process of implementation of agreements in the field of security between Ankara and Moscow will not be accompanied by illegal actions and human rights violations in these very countries. Today, many Islamists, especially Salafis in North Caucasus, face unlawful persecution at home and leave for Turkey. The economic sanctions applied against Russia over the conflict in Ukraine, and the counter-sanctions on the agricultural products, have set the need for Russia’s diversification of the supply of its produce, and Turkey could be one of such suppliers if the volumes are increased. This raises the question of solving the problem of transportation through the South Caucasus. In particular, we cannot exclude the launch of negotiations on the resumption of traffic on the Transcaucasian highway - the shortest route from Central Russia to Turkey and Iran. This road would be more reliable than the Georgian Military route, in order to connect Russia with Armenia, too. At the same time we see that the improvements do not take place in all directions. Moscow is traditionally wary of perceiving any Turkish activity in North Caucasus - both in terms of the Turkic peoples (Kumyks, Nogai, Balkars, Karachai) and Circassians. Currently the issue of the Crimean Tatars has also come afore. Recently a report on human rights violations in the Crimea was published in Turkey, a move Moscow is not very likely to approve.
Armen Minasyan (Armenia)
Panorama.am
Question:
Do you think an escalation of other frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space can be expected?
Answer:
I think each of these conflicts should be treated separately, the risks and opportunities are very different for each. Although currently against the background of extreme aggravation of relations between Russia and the West and Moscow's efforts to strengthen its own influence in countries that it considers its zone of strategic interests - especially in the post-Soviet space - we can certainly see some changes almost everywhere. In South Ossetia and Abkhazia they believe that the republics can again become the fault line where the interests of Russia and Western countries will end up clashing. These fears are partly made instrumental by Moscow, which offers them its protection. At the same time, the new agreements on cooperation and security, signed in late 2014 and early 2015 with Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, that in fact extended the Russian border to the south, have caused very mixed reactions not only in Georgia and in the West, but also in these very republics. Moscow frequent ignores the local interests or imposes its political will: this leads to a growing discontent with the policy Russia pursues in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Moscow often interpretsthese as ingratitude or even anti-Russian sentiments and adds drivers of conflict in the already volatile region. Against the background of Chişinău strengthening ties with the EU, we can see the activation of the pro-Russian rhetoric in Transnistria and Gagauzia - in the situation currently in placein neighboring Ukraine, in the circumstance of the openly waged armed conflict, this makes the situation in Moldova extremely panicky. There are also other regions that are not usually enumerated as regions with frozen conflicts, but, nevertheless, the Ukrainian conflict has had its influence on them, too. For example, Northern Kazakhstan, home to the second largest Russian diaspora, after Ukraine. This Diaspora Russian population lives mainly along the border with Russia. At the end of last year, I conducted research there. And although in the public space things look relatively calm, the grievances and problems that exist among the local Russian populationcan become instrumental in the case of aggravation of relations between Moscow and Astana unless they receive an adequate response from the official Kazakhstan. In particular, there is a very low representation of the Russian population in the civil service, the problem is that they do not speak Kazakh and a gradual ousting of the Russian language is happening from the public sphere, with the replacement of the historically Russian names with those in Kazakh. There is militaristic rhetoric in Moscow, up to allegations of a possible use of nuclear weapons, alongwith the growth of the Russian military budget, the constant drills in different parts of the country, support for paramilitary forces in Ukraine. On the other hand, NATO has strengthened its positions in Europe and many people in Europe fear the possibility of a Russian attack. This raises very serious concerns. When there are too many arms, it can lead to a new outbreak of an armed conflict.
David Stepanyan (Armenia)
ArmInfo News Agency
Question:
What are the advantages and disadvantages you see in the policy Russia pursues today towards Caucasus, particularly towards Armenia, as well as what are those in Moscow's policy within the post-Soviet space as a whole?
Answer:
Moscow is bad at working with democratic regimes which are, apparently, perceived as unpredictable. Here we see problems similar to the domestic policy: there is not a sufficient number of experts among those who make decisions; often the unwillingness to listen to claimsis not the essence of the existing problems –at that, this is often even more pronounced in the relations with allies; the communication style which often does not involve equal partnership. In the recent years, Moscow has obviously been trying to make greater use of soft power, in particular at the cost of significant financial investments in information campaigns.
David Stepanyan (Armenia)
ArmInfo News Agency
Question:
The Armenian society is observing the economic rapprochement of Russia and Turkey with a certain anxiety, based on phobias and real negative experiences. Do you share these concerns?
Answer:
As I said above, I think Russia and Turkey have areas where cooperation is needed. At the same time, I believe, for Moscow with Armenia is a very important partnership, in particular, regarding the presence of Russian military bases in the situation when the threat from the Middle East is perceived as a more and more serious one.
Tatevik Kazaryan (Armenia)
News.am
Question:
Ms. Pakhomenko, do you expect any serious progress on the upcoming Karasin-Abashidze meeting in Prague in July, given that, according to Abashidze, the first talks will be held in an expanded format - with the participation of the economic departments of the two countries?
Answer:
There is a feeling that at this stage the negotiations have reached the top. Tbilisi expects that Moscow will agree to some concessions in the talks on South Ossetia and Abkhazia, it also hopes have a simplified visa regime for Georgian citizens in Russia. None of this is happening yet. Apparently, Moscow is waiting for changes in the political landscape of Georgia in the upcoming elections. At the same time, it is likely that there will be some progress regarding the implementation of the agreement on Russia's accession to the WTO which involves the creation of corridors across South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This issue was raised in Prague back in February.
Karine Asatryan (Armenia)
A1+ TV company
Question:
What is the evaluation of the threat of ISIS in the Caucasus, and is there any information about the number of Muslims, originally from the Caucasus, who are fighting for the "Islamic state"?
Answer:
The threat of the "Islamic state" is evaluated very seriously. There are ethnic Chechens in the leadership of ISIS. It is thanks to their influence that the topic of Russia is believed to have returned onto the agenda of global jihad - at a global level it was never seriously remembered after the first Chechen war. Last year, at the proclamation of the Caliphate, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi called Russia, along with the United States, one of the main enemies of Muslims. In September, ISISthreatened Putin that they would establish control over North Caucasus. After that, the process of reorienting the underground towards the ISIS ideology began in the region. If initially those who supported ISIS, left for Syria and Iraq - the number of those Russian citizens who are fighting on the side of both ISIS and other groups against the official Damascus and Baghdad, are estimated by the Russian security forces as ranging from 1,700 to 5,000 people and most of them are from North Caucasus (mainly Dagestan and Chechnya, but also from Kabardino-Balkaria and other republics), now they have found it possible to fight on behalf of the ISIS already in the Caucasus. Since November, when the first of the leaders of militias from Dagestan swore to al-Baghdadi, an oath was made by the amir (leader) of the underground of all Dagestan RustamAsilderov, in June 2015 an oath was made by the well-known leader of the Chechen underground Amir Khamzat (ArslanByutukaev), and on June 21 there was an audio message of the oath of all the militants in Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. Two days later, the press service of ISIS declared its acceptance of the oath and the formation of a new Wilayat (province) of ISIS in North Caucasus, and appointed Amir RustamAsilderova to be its governor. This is a new page in the history of the underground in North Caucasus. Having started as a national liberation movement in Chechnya in the early 1990s, it has gradually assimilated the idea of armed jihad. In 2007, with the proclamation of the "Caucasus Emirate" a supra-regional structure with jihadist ideology was created, and now we can see how it has evolved and become a part of the global jihad.
Tatevik Kazaryan (Armenia)
News.am
Question:
What are the prospects of the EU "Eastern Partnership" program, as you see them?
Answer:
We see that Ukraine's rapprochement with the EU was taken negatively by Moscow, which prioritizes its own economic relations with Ukraine. This eventually led to a full-scale conflict in the east of Ukraine. It seems that a similar rapprochement between Tbilisi and the EU is perceived much calmer in Russia – the Georgian market is not comparable to the volume of the Ukrainian one and is not so closely integrated with Russia. While many believe that one reason for signing new agreements between Moscow and Sukhumi/Tshivnali was the desire to react with an integration project similar to the European one. The absence of substantial progress by the Georgian authorities in the European direction - for example, the fact that the liberalization of the visa regime with Europe has not happened yet- leads to a growing discontent with the government among the population and brings about stronger support for the integration project with Russia.
Emil Babayan (Armenia)
EurAsia Daily
Question:
Hello, Varvara! Here are a few questions from the EurAsia Daily.
Recently, much has been said about the presence of ISIS agents in the Caucasus. In late June, for example, the remaining members of the "Caucasian Emirate" took an oath. In addition, there is increased activity of ISIS agents in Georgia. What, in your opinion, is the threat posed by ISIS for the three South Caucasus countries and the North Caucasus region?
Answer:
Good afternoon! I spoke a little bit about the growing influence of ISIS in North Caucasus and about the militants’oath in my answer to Karina Asatryan’s question. As for Georgia - indeed, we see that the citizens of Georgia are fighting in Syria. According to different estimates, 40 to 200 people arrived there from the Pankisi Gorge, which is a lot when weighed against the population of the gorge. If we are to speak about the threats to the regions of North and South Caucasus, we can assess the threat as quite a serious one. First, the methods used by ISIS, are extremely brutal: they use sophisticated executions and terroristic acts. In North Caucasus these methods have never been supported by the public. The Amir of the "Caucasus Emirate" AliaskhabKebekov, who got killed last April, who rigidly countered ISIS, called for more moderate methods: banned terrorist attacks against the civilian population, prohibited women’s participation in the underground activities and did not let them become suicide bombers, called for militants to surrender, if they found themselves in a siege, not to kill religious opponents only because of a difference of opinion, not to extort money from the population - the so-called "tax on jihad", that was collected forcefully. It was believed that he was trying to strengthen the support of the local people in this manner. Now, after the oath to ISIS it can be expected that the militants in the region will use more violent methods, also doing acts of terrorism in other regions - for example, in central Russia. It is also likely that the funding which was previously 90% local, will now begin to increasingly arrive from Syria. There ISIS has its own oil wells. Unlike al-Qaeda, which previously the "Caucasus Emirate" was guided by and mainly built its ideology on the basis of the criticism the existing regimes, ISIS offers a "positive" agenda - the creation of social institutions, the construction of the state –a social utopia where everyone is equal before Allah. Given the weakness of the institutions of the secular state, human rights violations, and class stratification, due to its ideology ISISis becoming even more popular in a society where there is a huge request for justice. In this sense, it is not just a threat to security, but a challenge to the basics of statehood in the predominantly Muslim region, where there is an alternative concept of statehood, based on sharia.
Emil Babayan (Armenia)
EurAsia Daily
Question:
ICG has recently published a report entitled "Chechnya: an Internal Foreign Land", where there are a number of strict evaluations of the Kremlin's policy towards Chechnya, the Chechen leadership policy within the country, the growth of jihadist sentiments in the region, and so on. The report also contains a dozen recommendations to the governments of Russia and Chechnya for dealing with these and other problems. In this regard, I have two questions: first, how is this whole situation related to the ISIS factor and the growth of its influence? Secondly, how could the application of these recommendations weaken this relationship?
Answer:
Having proven their willingness to die for the independence for centuries, the Chechens do not seem very receptive of the suicidal ideology of the global jihad. Many of those who shared that ideology, went to fight in Syria, which is why the ranks of militants in North Caucasus have considerably thinned on the whole and especially in Chechnya. According to a source in the Chechen Interior Ministry, 200-500 Chechens fought in Syria in 2013. There are ethnic Chechens from Pankisi in the ISIS leadership. Even though the idea of national self-determination is still popular in the Chechen Republic, the growing support for the ideas of radical Islamism is also becoming obvious. On the one hand, there is the imposition of the ideas of Sufi Islam at the state level, on the other - an extremely tough persecution of the so-called "non-traditional" Islam, especially Salafis. RamzanKadyrov has openly stated that it was necessary to kill the Wahhabis (the so-called Salafis in the country). Regularly mass arrests are organized to detain young men with beards and women wearing the hijab, covering the chin. Guys are taken to police stations, often beaten or forced to shave their beards, after they get beaten by their relatives. All this makes young people terribly angry, sets them against the state and often makes them even more radical in their beliefs. We know of cases when, faced with unlawful, often degrading actions, young people join the underground, and some even leave for Syria. We urge to abandon these illegal practices, as not only do they violate human rights, but are also counter-productive in the long term; we urge to start a dialogue with the representatives of all branches of Islam who do not use violence, since the state should not take sides in religious disputes; we urge to establish mechanisms for the rehabilitation of former militants, allowing them to return to civilian life, similar to the one existent in neighboring Ingushetia. It is also necessary to strengthen the social institutions of the state - to improve the quality of health care, educationand to ensure a fair trial, because the Islamists channel popular discontent in all these areas, providing alternative institutions. This is a long process that requires a lot of effort, but it can bring long-term peace. Otherwise, we cannot exclude a new full-scale conflict in Chechnya.
Gagik Baghdasaryan (Armenia)
"Novosti Armenia"
Question:
Hello, Varvara! What do you think is the probability of Georgia’s accession to NATO? Isitpossibleintheforeseeablefuture?
Answer:
According to experts, the representatives of the alliance, the authorities of Georgia and Russia the prospect of Georgia’sNATO membershipseems unlikely in the foreseeable future. I assume NATO is not inclined to take a country with territorial conflicts that might erupt again and in this case NATO will face the probability of an armed conflict with Russia. Any approximation of NATO is very painfully perceived in Moscow and, I think, Tbilisi also understands that serious advancement towards the alliance mayeven cause a new war with Russia.
Gagik Baghdasaryan (Armenia)
"Novosti Armenia"
Question:
Currently Armenia and Georgia, in fact, have found themselves in two different political camps. Could this affect their relationship, or will the regional political realities themselves adjust the relationships?
Answer:
Hopefully, Tbilisi and Yerevan will proceed from the need to preserve peace in the region and no major conflicts will happen between them. It is in the vital interests of both countries.
Gagik Baghdasaryan (Armenia)
"Novosti Armenia"
Question:
Can Georgia put aside political motives and agree to the opening of the Abkhazian section of the railway, thus stimulating economic activity in the region?
Answer:
The issue of opening the Abkhazian section of the railway has already been raised by the Georgian authorities, but as far as we know, it caused a strong reaction of Baku. The resumption of rail traffic is a very complex issue. In this regard, there is no consensus in Abkhazia either. It is necessary to invest more heavily in the reconstruction of the remaining section of the railroad in the territory of Abkhazia. In my opinion, the reopening of the Transcaucasian highway through South Ossetia looks more realistic, which, as I see it, is in the interests of all parties and it would be easier and faster to agree over this matter.
"Hetq" Internet Newspaper (Armenia)
Question:
Varvara, are thedocuments on the integration signedbetween Russia and Abkhazia, and South Ossetia and Russia, as well as integration with Russia a solution and to which issues of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are they a solution to?
Answer:
First of all, in South Ossetia and Abkhazia this is perceived as a guarantee of security. If South Ossetia has stronger fears of a repeat of the war with Georgia - the trauma of 2008 is still there, and even though the risk of a conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia is not excluded, they rather believe that they can become an arena for clashes between Russia and the West since Georgia is perceived as a partner of Western countries in the region. Ordinary people also have a big need to improve the quality of life, social security, wages, and pensions. And they believe that they cannot achieve all that on their own, without Russian assistance. At the same time, and in both republics treaties are criticized as infringing on their sovereignty. Limited control over security forces is a particularly sensitive issue.
"Hetq" Internet Newspaper (Armenia)
Question:
How hard can the actions of Russia and the Chechen leadership be for the prevention the Chechen population’sexposure to ISIS as a whole?Is there a real threat of ISIS in Chechnya only? What is the situation like that with the other North Caucasus subjects of the Russian Federation? Could it be that the entire North Caucasus will be the so-called "internally foreign land" for Russia and the Russian society as a whole?
Answer:
I have already written that the jihadist underground acts throughout North Caucasus. And although in recent years its activity has decreased, mainly due to the outflow of potential and active fighters to Syria, the long-term resolution of the conflict does not happen. The problem is most acute in the eastern region –in Dagestan and Chechnya. The social institutions operate worse in this area, the state has, in fact, been privatized by the local leaders. The Islamist ideology - not only to the radical one as presented by ISIS - is becoming increasingly popular, filling in the power vacuum, forming alternative dispute resolution institutions based on sharia, Islamic clinics and educational institutions that are not corrupt. In the absence of public policy and competitive elections in Russia, Islamists have turned into a political opposition, channeling the most diverse forms of protest in North Caucasus. The proclamation of the Caliphate in Syria has added urgency to this matter - now it is perceived by many as a political entity, which could become a rival to the liberal Western world, whose policy, from the perspective of the Islamists, is based on double standards. At the same time, North Caucasus is increasingly seen as something alien by the residents of the rest of Russia, rising xenophobic sentiments; the idea of "Stop feeding the Caucasus" is very popular. This is a fundamental change since the 1990s, when most inhabitants of Russia thought that it was right to wage a war for keeping Chechnya as a part of Russia. For the long-term solution to this conflict it is necessary to gradually integrate the region with the rest of the country in all areas so that its residents no longer feel like second-class citizens. It is necessary to carefully monitor how the budget funds are spent, to see whether the money was spent on real development or whether it nurtured the local elites, and even ended up funding the underground movement. The state must show that the remaining secular, it guarantees freedom of religion, but holds accountable those who resort to violence.
+37410 563363
ул. Бузанда 1/3, 8-й этаж, Ереван, Армения