PART 2. THE ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI PEACE TREATY

NARRATIVES OF THE NEW ROUND OF “NIETHER PEACE, NOR WAR” IN ARMENIAN AND AZERBAIJANI MEDIA AND SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS

(December 2022 - May 2023) 

PART 2. THE ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI PEACE TREATY

Summary

Laura Baghdasaryan, Director of “Region”  Research Center (Armenia),
Arif Yunusov, Head of the Department of Conflict and Migration Studies of the Institute for Peace and Democracy (Azerbaijan)

It became publicly known that Armenia and Azerbaijan had reached an agreement to draft a peace treaty in April 2022, following the Brussels meeting of the leaders of the two countries. Prior to this, the acceptable principles of settlement for both parties (5 principles from Azerbaijan and 6 counter principles from Armenia) had been published in the Armenian and Azerbaijani media. Since then, there has been a lack of information regarding the actual peace treaty process. The incursion of Azerbaijani troops into the territory of Armenia and the September 13-14, 2022 battles, which resulted in the largest casualties for both sides after the 2020 war, the blockade of the Lachin Corridor since December 2022, a range of skirmishes on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border in March and May 2023 objectively led to the presumption that the peace process may have stalled and or even reversed. However, amidst a number of escalations on the border between the two countries, the ongoing blockade of the Armenian population of NK, in May 2023, two meetings of the Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan (May 1-4 in Washington, May 22 in Moscow), and two meetings of the Prime Minister of Armenia and President of Azerbaijan (May 14 in Brussels, May 25 in Moscow) were held. The central focus of all these negotiations was the peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The information disseminated after this about the upcoming Armenian-Azerbaijani meetings in June (Chisinau/ Moldova), July (Brussels), October (Granada/Spain) in this context created the  impression of a dynamic progress in the process. At the same time, the parties entered an active stage of promulgation of the entire comprehensive range of aspects of the Armenian-Azerbaijani post-war process. This promulgation, however, once again exposed stark divergence in the goals, perceptions of the negotiation process itself and narratives associated with them.

The Azerbaijani claims presented as an ultimatum requiring Armenia to unconditionally fulfil all the demands regarding the peace treaty or face a military solution to the same issues, essentially echo Azerbaijan’s pre-war official concept. According to this concept, if it is impossible to resolve issues by political means (with the return of territories on the Azerbaijani terms being the Azerbaijani understanding of a political solution), Azerbaijan will resort to military means to achieve its goals.
Meanwhile, even in the period between the first and second Karabakh wars, when Armenia held the position of the winner, Armenian officials refrained from resorting to the threat of force as a means to advance their interests. Throughout the studied period, there were a lot of debates and analyses with a striking divergence of views within the Armenian media and social media. These discussions primarily revolved around three crucial problems concerning the conclusion of peace with Azerbaijan: ensuring the security of Armenia itself, ensuring the security of NK, introduction of international mechanisms that will guarantee the implementation of the agreements reached. The criticism of opposition representatives and their leaders who have been negotiating with Azerbaijan over the course of nearly 30 years, Armenian experts, NK official circles is directed not only towards Azerbaijan, but also the Armenian authorities, who have declared their readiness to recognize the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, including the territories of the former NKAO (Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast). The NKR parliament was particularly critical of this statement.

On the Azerbaijani media and social networks, the political opposition disseminated narratives, which aligned with the views propagated by the Azerbaijani authorities. The consensus on the concept of “no war in exchange for the unconditional acceptance of all Azerbaijani terms by the Armenian side” was also being consistently emphasized in the speeches of public figures who in the past had been involved in the peace-building process facilitated by various international organizations and foreign governments. Azerbaijan’s categorical rejection of the establishment of international mechanisms and introduction of guarantor countries to ensure the implementation of the agreements reached, as well as the incorporation of provisions in the agreement’s text regarding the future of NK and its Armenian population was expressed across all levels of Azerbaijan's public statements.

Who needs a peace treaty more? The “unanimity” of the Armenian and Azerbaijani speakers that it is the opposite side that is interested in an earliest possible conclusion of a peace agreement between the RA and the AR is immediately swept aside when considering the motivation for such statements. Thus, from Armenian speakers’ perspective, Azerbaijan is interested in expediting the conclusion of peace, aiming to solidify the gains of the 2020 war. From Azerbaijani speakers’ perspective, Armenia and the Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh need peace more. In the first case, for Armenia’s self-preservation within its 29,800 sq. km territory, while in the second case, to get the opportunity to live in the territory of Azerbaijan.

The parties to the conflict have not refused to negotiate at the three mediating platforms (Washington, Brussels, Moscow), thus formally demonstrating their commitment to peace. And they have done this, despite the clearly different perception of the policies pursued by the host capitals with regards to the post-war Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation.

Read the full version in Russian HERE.

This research has been organized within the framework of the Region Research Center's project "New Agendas for Peace and Stability in the South Caucasus after the Karabakh 2020 War". The project is being implemented by the support of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation. The opinions expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the opinions and positions of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation or its partners.