THE COVERAGE OF THE 2024 RUSSIAN AND AZERBAIJANI PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS BY THE MEDIA OF BOTH COUNTRIES

Azerbaijani Media Reports on Elections in Russia

Arif Yunusov, Head of the Department of Conflict and Migration Studies of the Institute for Peace and Democracy (Azerbaijan)

The news of the Russian presidential elections in March 2024 virtually didn’t spark much interest in Azerbaijani society. Media periodically reported on the course of the pre-election process in Russia, with occasional commentary in specific TV programs. The lukewarm attitude in Azerbaijan was due to the fact that the Russian elections did not foreshadow any intrigue, the outcomes were widely anticipated, and there was no doubt that they would mirror the presidential elections in Azerbaijan, held nearly a month earlier (February 7) than the Russian elections. In this regard, the upcoming November 2024 presidential elections in the United States are of much greater interest to Azerbaijani society, because in Azerbaijan there is an understanding that genuine elections are happening in the United States, there will be a fierce struggle with intrigue and, most importantly, significant implications, including for Azerbaijan. In contrast, the electoral process in Russia is viewed as a mere imitation, to which everyone in Azerbaijan has grown accustomed over the years.

However, pro-government media and TV channels still attempted to artificially amplify the intrigue around the elections in Russia, particularly emphasizing that they would be held against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine. This implied, as they suggested, that the Russian army’s failures could potentially affect Putin’s rating and affect the election outcome.  And then, almost immediately, as if frightened by such forecasts, they nevertheless reassured their audiences, stating that “with a high degree of probability Russians will re-elect Putin as president,” because, based on their own assessments, “... the current president of Russia is a person who has radically transformed the image of his country, has firmly entered into world politics and deftly uses all available means to reestablish Russia’s leadership in global politics.”

The news of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s death in custody on February 16, 2024, sparked a much stronger reaction in Azerbaijani society. It is just worth noting that in Baku, at the monument to Huseyn Javid, a renowned Azerbaijani playwright and victim of Stalin’s repressions of 1937, there was a spontaneous event in memory of Alexei Navalny: unidentified individuals placed bouquets and a photograph of Alexei Navalny at the monument. This gesture also found support among diplomats, with the ambassadors of the United States and the United Kingdom to Azerbaijan also laying wreaths at the monument in memory of Navalny. In response, individuals close to the authorities sought to downplay the significance of Navalny by recalling the remarks he had made regarding migrants.

No less intense debates unfolded on social networks among politicians and civil society representatives. Ali Karimli, leader of the prominent opposition party Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF), wrote on his Facebook page that Navalny’s death should “shock the world. The dormant conscience must awaken. The whole world must realize that any dictatorship is inherently inhumane. World leaders must understand that a tolerant, restrained, toothless, indecisive approach towards dictatorships constitutes an injustice to the millions suppressed by these regimes.” Karimli concluded his post by stating: “He died, but he won a moral victory. His death struck a severe blow to the Russian regime. I am convinced that neither the Russian people nor the international community will forgive the regime that murdered an unyielding fighter. This will accelerate the collapse of the Putin regime.”

According to Arif Hajili, the head of another opposition party, Musavat, Navalny’s death “... will have a serious impact on political developments in Russia.” Anar Mammadli, the head of the Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Center (EMDS), in turn, emphasized that Navalny was a figure who had sacrificed his life for freedom and democratic changes in Russia: “By showing indifference to the death of such courageous people, Russia is going through the most shameful period of its history.”

Discussing Russia’s main opposition leader’s death, Azerbaijani public and political figures expressed views about its potential ramifications for Azerbaijan. As Azer Gasimli, the director of the Institute of Political Management, pointed out, opponents of authoritarian regimes were being killed not only in Russia, but also in Belarus and Azerbaijan. “In this sense, this is not a new trend. But, on the other hand, authoritarian regimes have recently adopted more aggressive behaviors, resorting to more brutal methods when faced with desperation.” In conclusion, Gasimli noted: “As for Azerbaijan, the country might witness a further tightening of its authoritarian regime, with the authorities pursuing a similar course of action with the backing of Russia. This cannot be excluded, since, in essence, the regimes of Aliyev and Putin are more or less the same. They both belong to the former Soviet system’s elite and share largely similar thought patterns. In other words, if Aliyev’s regime finds itself in a dead end, it may resort to this in order to maintain its power.”

The Russian presidential elections bore striking similarities to those in Azerbaijan in many respects, with the most painful aspect for Azerbaijani authorities being the Western reaction to the election outcomes. That is why, as the Russian elections concluded, the pro-government online media and TV channels of Azerbaijan enthusiastically announced Putin’s victory, emphasizing in every possible way his “broad support from the Russian people,” and framing Putin’s victory as “the victory of Russian society’s unity.” Naturally, in Azerbaijan, special attention was paid not only to the unprecedented amount of votes in favor of Putin, but also to the record-breaking voter turnout. 

Meanwhile, Azerbaijani media voiced their complete frustration with the West, which refused to recognize the results of the elections in Azerbaijan. As highlighted in the pro-government newspaper Yeni Musavat, “despite the West’s attempts to disrupt the presidential elections in Russia, they proceeded smoothly, culminating in Vladimir Putin’s anticipated win. There’s considerable speculation around this matter, and the central intrigue for “foreign powers” lies in whether the West will recognize the legitimacy of the newly elected head of state.”

As expected, the Azerbaijani opposition remained highly skeptical regarding the results of the elections in Russia, constantly drawing parallels with those in Azerbaijan. APF leader A. Karimli took a sarcastic tone on his Facebook page, stating, “Let’s give credit to Putin and his team, who made great efforts to surpass the record results set by Ilham Aliyev in the presidential campaign. But it didn’t work. Despite the Russian elections running non-stop for three days, with full mobilization of government agencies and entrepreneurs, they only managed to achieve a turnout of 74%, whereas in Azerbaijan this figure stood at 76%. Putin claimed 88% of the votes for himself,” thereby “failing to break Ilham Aliyev’s record of “winning” 92%. That's the mark of a leader in this region.”

Independent experts and journalists also paid attention to the results of elections abroad, since the majority of those who voted for Putin (more than 77%) appeared to be in Azerbaijan. In other words, Russians in Azerbaijan turned out to be the most supportive of Putin. Journalist Kamal Ali elaborated on this phenomenon on his Facebook page and blog, suggesting that “ fewer political exiles from Russia reside in Azerbaijan compared to other countries. This is primarily due to close political ties between Baku and Moscow, which led those fleeing Russia to fear potential extradition requests if they settled in Azerbaijan. ... Secondly, another factor that concerns everyone is that these people are not politically engaged; they hope to return to Russia and thus refrain from demonstrating their negative sentiments towards Putin.” 

Russian Media Reports on Elections in Azerbaijan

Laura Baghdasaryan, Director of ''Region'' Research Center

The Azerbaijani elections were covered on Russian information platforms through informational updates and reports, starting from the very announcement of the decree by the incumbent President of Azerbaijan regarding snap elections on February 7, 2024.

The reasons behind another snap presidential election in Azerbaijan (the previous ones occurring in 2018 and also being held ahead of schedule) were discussed in Russian media only during the early stages of the election process; basically, throughout the entire cycle, Russian audiences were presented with current informational reports on elections. The question of “Why did I. Aliyev need early elections right now?” was mainly addressed through insights from Azerbaijani speakers appearing on Russian media platforms, including through a detailed coverage of I. Aliyev’s interview on this topic for Azerbaijani TV channels a month before the elections. Additionally, some Russian experts provided individual comments, attributing this decision to I. Aliyev's desire to capitalize on Azerbaijan's success in restoring its territorial integrity and to hold a “referendum of approval and recognition of Ilham Aliyev's leadership merits.”

Thanks to the involvement of Russian journalists in the group of foreign media representatives who arrived in Azerbaijan to cover the electoral process, a number of pieces were released on this topic on voting day. The Armenian-Azerbaijani context was addressed in even fewer cases, primarily appearing in reports of Russian journalists who, accompanied by Azerbaijani counterparts, traveled to Karabakh to cover the voting of Azerbaijani settlers and describe their experiences. Some reports depicted the sentiments of Azerbaijani settlers, who were allowed to return and vote in their places of former residence, expressing their gratitude to I. Aliyev for the opportunity, with no acknowledgment of the recent Armenian presence in the region just five months prior to the elections. In rarer instances, certain reports highlighted the exodus of the Armenian population from Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023 and the subsequent atmosphere in the region, where "not a single sign in Armenian could be found.” Illustrative of this are two reports published in “Izvestia” by two different journalists who visited various settlements of the Karabakh region renamed by Azerbaijan.

A report released on election day highlighted a key aspect of the campaign: it marked the first time elections were held in Karabakh. Azerbaijani journalist Sh. Rzayev pointed out that the primary reason the two main opposition parties refrained from fielding candidates was not due to their stated “lack of confidence in a fair vote count,” but rather because they simply “don't want to embarrass themselves, given the inevitability that their candidates would not secure even a small percentage of the votes.” No one, including the journalist himself, doubted I. Aliyev’s victory.

Another piece pointed out that “no one talks about the Armenians forced to leave the lands that they also consider their homeland. It seems that none of the locals is interested in this story.” The itinerary of foreign journalists was strictly regulated, “...all requests to visit Khankendi (formerly Stepanakert) were rejected. The logic is obvious: Azerbaijan wants to steer media attention towards its post-2020 military campaign achievements rather than the escape of Armenians from territories they inhabited for centuries. However, the inability to demonstrate how remaining Armenians (if any) are integrated into Azerbaijani legal framework raises questions from an informational standpoint.”

Apparently, this journalist also wanted to witness I. Aliyev and his family members casting their vote in Stepanakert. This event was subsequently presented by I. Aliyev as the symbol of not just casting his ballot, but hammering the last nail “into the coffin of Armenian separatists.” These words by Aliyev uttered during the inauguration (February 14, 2024) went unmentioned in Russian media reports covering the inauguration ceremony. Even Vestnik Kavkaza, a Russian source known for its pro-Azerbaijani stance and occasional manipulation in covering the Armenian-Azerbaijani context, omitted Aliyev's statement in its inauguration coverage.

One of the first foreign leaders who officially congratulated I. Aliyev on his victory with more than 92% of votes was the incumbent President of Russia V. Putin. The Russian Ambassador to Azerbaijan M. Evdokimov underscored that “the development of bilateral relations between Russia and Azerbaijan is rooted in years of respectful relations between the two presidents - Vladimir Putin and Ilham Aliyev”, and that the Russian-Azerbaijani dialogue “... is not subject to any momentary changes; relations continue to grow stronger, so we did not anticipate and do not anticipate that the presidential elections in Azerbaijan would bring about any alterations...”

The statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry on the results of the elections in Azerbaijan also emphasized the high standards upheld in the conduct of elections in Azerbaijan. This statement was echoed by the CIS Secretary General S. Lebedev, Chair of the Federation Council Committee on Foreign Affairs  G. Karasin (the voting was held under conditions of competitive alternatives and in a favorable environment), SCO Secretary-General Zhang Ming (the elections were open and transparent).

However, the Russian Foreign Ministry commented on the assessments of “the West and the international structures controlled by them” pointing at their extremely biased attitude towards the presidential elections in Azerbaijan. Regarding the future prospects, “the Russian side... is committed to further strengthening the alliance and strategic partnership with the Republic of Azerbaijan, active collaboration on international and regional issues, including the implementation of the full array of trilateral agreements reached at the highest level, aimed at normalizing Armenian-Azerbaijani relations.”

This is another piece in a series planned within the framework of the “Armenian-Azerbaijani Context in the Presidential Elections of Azerbaijan and Russia - 2024” Project of the “Region” Research Center.

Publication of this material is supported by Democracy Development Foundation. The opinions and positions expressed in the material may not reflect the views and positions of Democracy Development Foundation.